The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

This was a perfectly sensible plan, drawn up and co-ordinated largely
by Milch. Göring had serviceable and ready 2,422 aircraft with which to
fulfil his aim, of which 949 were bombers, 336 dive-bombers, 869 Me
109s, and 268 Me 110 Zerstörers. Destruction of the RAF would take three
days, but to be on the safe side Göring wanted four clear days of weather.
The timing of the attack, then, was the only remaining sticking point. The
next few days were not looking good, but from 10 August a ridge of high
pressure from the Azores promised to give them the window they needed.
With everything now agreed and ready for the off, the Reichsmarschall
led his commanders to see his latest toy: a vast model train set, complete
with miniature farms, houses, stations and six-foot-high papier-mâché
mountains. Beaming happily, Göring pressed a button and a flight of
bombers running on wires whirred smoothly overhead.
The contrast between the Reichsmarschall and Air Chief Marshal ‘Stuffy’
Dowding could not have been greater. When Colonel Raymond Lee visited
Bentley Priory the next day, Wednesday, 7 August, he found the C-in-C
Fighter Command a tall, saturnine man who spoke clearly and calmly. ‘He
is the man,’ noted Lee, ‘who directs the force which, more than anything
else today, stands between Britain and invasion.’ Dowding took him down
below to the underground Filter and Operations Rooms. Lee was struck by
the quiet. Only a soft murmur could be heard as messages came and went
over headsets, or plotters moved markers from point to point across the
giant map table. Dowding carefully explained what was going on and how
the system worked. Lee was deeply impressed. ‘I had no idea,’ he jotted,
‘the British could evolve and operate so intricate, so scientific and rapid an
organization, the tentacles of which reach out beyond the edges of the
country.’
What neither Schmid nor the Luftwaffe command knew was that
Dowding had been prudent with his squadrons during July, keeping plenty
in reserve in the north. The pilots of 609 Squadron had been getting
frustrated at being ordered up in small numbers, but both Park and the C-in-
C had quite deliberately kept as many aircraft from operating over the open
sea as possible, both well aware that they were probably being deliberately
drawn out by the Luftwaffe. Fighter Command had more than 700 fighters,
a marked improvement since the beginning of July. No fewer than 496 new
fighters had also been built by Beaverbrook’s workforces since then. By 8