The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

number of existing airfields, and other logistical issues of maintenance,
airfield protection and infrastructure. Already, he said, Park was demanding
more pilots for five of 11 Group’s squadrons, which were now understrength
but had been in the front line for just a short period.
Sholto Douglas insisted that Dowding was being too pessimistic, and
reeled off pilot figures that suggested they had ample numbers of new men
coming through. But Dowding retorted that it was one thing to be a trained
pilot, and quite another to be a combat-ready fighter pilot. At current rates,
they were losing 120 pilots a week, a rate that could not be sustained.
Losses were now outstripping those coming through the OTUs and the
course had already been cut to two weeks. This meant that some pilots were
being sent to squadrons with as little as ten hours on Spitfires and
Hurricanes. Park now backed up Dowding, pointing out that he had already
been forced to put together composite squadrons, a practice to which
Dowding was vehemently opposed. ‘You must realize,’ Dowding said to
Douglas, ‘that we are going downhill.’
Park had been dealing with the problem of under-trained pilots by
insisting they were given further training with the squadron before being
made operational. This, he said, was no longer possible, but he now
suggested a new scheme. New pilots could be sent to squadrons in the north
for extra training, while only fully trained pilots from the north would be
sent to squadrons in the south. Dowding pointed out that he needed fresh
operational squadrons to exchange with 11 Group’s battle-exhausted
squadrons. The two schemes could run in tandem, Park replied. He was
only suggesting importing individual pilots, not entire squadrons, and
proposed this should take effect only when a squadron’s quota of pilots fell
below fifteen. Dowding – and Douglas, for what it was worth – agreed to
Park’s proposal. From now on, squadrons were to be given categorization.
Class A were those squadrons in 11 Group and some in 10 and 12 Group
like 609 and 87 Squadrons, for example, which were fully operational and
had their quota of sixteen or more combat-ready pilots. Class B squadrons
would contain up to six non-operational pilots in a quota of sixteen, while
Class C squadrons would retain at least three fully operational pilots. Most
Class C squadrons would be in 13 Group, although there would be some in
10 and 12 Groups too. It was the best they could do in the circumstances.
They now had to hope that, in the days to come, it would be enough.