The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

formations, some simply to patrol the Channel and others to occasionally
deliver feint attacks. All would appear on the British radar screens and all
would have to be dealt with, but not all would then develop into real raids.
It was simple and effective and immediately put a considerable added strain
on 11 Group.
In fact, Park had already started to worry that his fighters were not
making enough successful interceptions when compared with the number of
sorties flown. This was because of cloud and inaccuracies of plotting, but
he felt his squadrons were stretched so thin they could ill afford such
mistakes. It also worried him that single squadrons were often engaging
large formations because the other fighters scrambled had not arrived in
time or at all. He now ordered fighter leaders to make a visual report of
size, height and direction of any enemy formation they spotted, which could
be immediately relayed to other fighters already airborne.
The next day, 27 August, he issued another instruction to his Group
controllers. It had been agreed that should heavy enemy raids be heading
for 11 Group airfields within easy reach of 10 and 12 Group squadrons,
then these neighbouring units could be called upon to help. Park felt that 10
Group had been co-operating magnificently. ‘Up to date, 12 Group, on the
other hand,’ he wrote, his frustration all too apparent, ‘have not shown the
same desire to co-operate by despatching their Squadrons to the places
requested.’ The result, he stated, was that on two occasions in recent days,
they had not patrolled the airfields as asked and that these stations had been
heavily bombed as a result. This being so, Park now instructed his sector
controllers to make any future requests for reinforcements direct to the
Controller at Fighter Command HQ.
It was a direct criticism of AVM Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the
commander of 12 Group, although Park cared less about upsetting
colleagues than ensuring the safety of his squadrons and their airfields. The
two men had never got on well, and Park certainly did not have a high
opinion of Leigh-Mallory’s understanding of modern fighter tactics. One of
the reasons for 12 Group’s no-show was Leigh-Mallory’s desire to bring a
maximum strength of fighters to bear against the approaching enemy
formations. Rather than sending a squadron or even a flight against the
attackers, Leigh-Mallory believed it was better to try and meet such raids
with two or three squadrons, operating at wing strength. To bring these
squadrons into one formation, however, took time – too much time, as had