The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

colleagues and displaying single-minded ruthlessness was the kind of
attitude he liked to see from the Nazi leadership. And, in fact,
Beaverbrook’s short-termism, where future projects and reserves were put
to one side in the interests of resolving the immediate crisis, was precisely
the mindset Hitler had adopted in his preparation for war in the west. The
big difference was that, unlike the RAF, the Luftwaffe had no Beaverbrook
in charge of aircraft production.
It was true that Germany was suffering economically and from a
shortage of raw materials during the winter and spring of 1939, but thanks
to Hitler’s go-for-broke orders the Luftwaffe was not struggling from a
shortage of aluminium or other key components. Her aircraft factories were
well-established and had, by 1940, considerable experience of producing
large numbers of aircraft, unlike the RAF. Admittedly, there had been
bottlenecks on the German railways which had held things up, but operating
to all intents and purposes on a peacetime footing there should have been no
excuse for the slow rate of production.
With Milch sidelined from the entire procurement and production
process, it was left to Udet to whip the industry into an urgent, highly
efficient organization that was operating to maximum capabilities. This,
however, simply did not happen. Udet did not have Beaverbrook’s drive,
experience and understanding of how big business could operate. Individual
manufacturers were largely left to their own devices, and although Udet
regularly visited Heinkel, Junkers and others, he never seemed to check too
closely on what they were actually doing.
He had also been hit hard by the continual delays to the Ju 88, but with
an offensive against the west looming had, in the spring of 1940, urged
Heinkel to speed up development of the four-engine He 177 heavy bomber.
Production was now to be rushed, without adequate testing, so that by the
spring Heinkel’s factories were due to be producing 120 He 177s per
month. Late in March, Udet visited Ernst Heinkel. The strain was showing;
Udet was smoking continuously and seemed restless and edgy. ‘I hope there
won’t be any trouble with the He 177,’ he told Heinkel. ‘The Ju 88 has
caused enough difficulty for my taste. The He 177 has got to get into
operation. We don’t have any other large bomber that we can use against
England. The He 177 has got to fly! It must!’
His anxieties seemed to leave him the moment victory was assured in
France. Depression was replaced by euphoria. The war was over, and none