The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

Hugh Dalton, the Minister for Economic Warfare, had also been thinking
about ‘black’ propaganda and ‘special’, clandestine operations that could
involve sabotage in enemy-occupied territory. After lengthy discussions
with members of the Foreign Office, the War Cabinet and other officials, it
was agreed that such an organization should be set up with a controller
armed with almost unlimited authority. Late on the evening of 16 July, at
around 11.30 p.m., Churchill told Dalton, who had been lobbying hard for
the post, that he would become chairman of what would be called the
Special Operations Executive. Lord Swinton was also recalled to head MI6,
the secret intelligence operation within Britain and Ireland. As Chamberlain
wrote to the War Cabinet once the decision had been ratified by them, SOE
would conduct ‘operations of sabotage, secret subversive propaganda, the
encouragement of civil resistance in occupied areas, the stirring up of
insurrection, strikes, etc.’. Churchill put it more succinctly. ‘And now,’ he
told Dalton, ‘go and set Europe ablaze.’
The Prime Minister had come to the conclusion that an imminent German
invasion was unlikely. The increased coastal defences, the appointment of
Brooke, in whom he had high hopes, the establishment of SOE, the
performance so far of Fighter Command – all these factors had strengthened
his belief that a corner had been turned. He found it hard to visualize an
invasion all along the coast by troops in hundreds of small craft. There was,
he pointed out to the War Cabinet, no evidence of large numbers of small
craft being assembled. Furthermore, surprise seemed out of the question.
The Admiralty had now amassed some thousand patrol craft, of which two
or three hundred were always now at sea, and there were the destroyer
flotillas all the way from Portsmouth to the Humber.
A more concrete strategy for the war was also beginning to evolve in
his mind. In essence, this had always been to ride out the current storm and
then gradually strike back, but as the days passed and still Germany did not
launch her all-out attack, the way forward seemed clearer, more possible.
Britain could impose its own economic blockade on Germany, helped by
Bomber Command. Penning Germany in, combined with sustained
bombing, could eventually starve Nazi Europe into submission. Allied to
this was the firm belief, shared by his ministers, that the German economy
had already peaked and would not be able to sustain a long, drawn-out war.
By the winter of 1940–1, it was confidently expected, Germany would be