The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

circumstances – after all, where could they go once they had fallen back to
the sea? Nonetheless, it caused a further headache for Gort, who had just
plugged the gap between the BEF and the Belgian army but would have to
fill another hole in his line once the Belgians were out of the fight
altogether. As Churchill pointed out – and this had still not been authorized
by the War Cabinet at this stage – evacuation now looked like the only
option. This being the case, there was a good chance, he told them, of
getting off a considerable number of the BEF. There was little reason,
however, for his optimism on that score.
Churchill then told them that Paul Reynaud would shortly be arriving
and that the Cabinet should be prepared to hear from him that the French
could not carry on the fight. The Prime Minister then announced that he had
previously asked the Chiefs of Staff to prepare a document about what
Britain should do if the French were to drop out of the war. ‘What are the
prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably
Italy?’ Churchill asked, reading out the remit he had given the Chiefs of
Staff. ‘Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of
preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island
cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000
men?’
The Chiefs of Staff made some comments in turn and then Halifax
spoke up. ‘On the broader issue,’ he said, ‘we have to face the fact that it is
not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany
but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible
that of France.’ In other words, he now believed the Nazis were unbeatable.
In this connection, he then told them about his meeting with Bastianini the
day before. Mussolini’s principal wish was to secure peace in Europe.
That would mean peace under German domination. ‘That we could
never accept,’ said Churchill emphatically. ‘We must ensure our complete
liberty and independence. I am opposed to any negotiations which might
lead to a derogation of our rights and power.’
None of the other War Cabinet members agreed or disagreed with either
Halifax or Churchill, and after a few more comments on Italy’s intentions,
the eighteen-page aide-memoire prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, entitled
‘British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality’, was handed out. Chamberlain
then asked if it was possible to ask the French whether Italy could be
bought off. ‘This,’ he pointed out, ‘might at least keep matters going.’