The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

178, whose maiden flight was in June 1939, was blocked by Udet; he had
already promised jet development to Messerschmitt.
There were worrying production problems as well – a task that also fell
within Udet’s remit. Shortage of aluminium and steel was part of the
problem; so too was competition for those raw materials from other areas of
the armed forces. Hitler’s refusal to mobilize the economy on an all-out war
footing was another contributory factor. Udet’s inadequate understanding of
the industry, his lack of initiative and his poor leadership further frustrated
production efforts. As a result, production of the major front-line aircraft
throughout the winter of 1939–40 was pitifully small: in February 1940, for
example, a paltry sixty-two Me 110s, seventy-six 109s, thirty Dornier 17s,
fifty-eight He 111s, sixty-six Stukas and fifty Junkers 88s.
In May 1940, the Luftwaffe was headed by an over-mighty commander
whose eye was only partly on the task in hand, and who encouraged
dissension and rivalry between his immediate subordinates. Milch, the one
man capable of infusing the Luftwaffe with the drive and unity it needed,
was constantly battling to maintain his authority and to deflect the hostile
stance of Jeschonnek, and increasingly Udet as well. Jeschonnek, in turn,
found it hard to work with either Milch or Udet. Udet was simply out of his
depth.
A house can have cracks so long as there is no storm. In May 1940, it
seemed as though the Luftwaffe had the world at its feet, its power and
strength undoubted. So long as France and Britain could be knocked out of
the war swiftly, then the cracks would remain just that. Only if the battle
continued would those cracks begin to widen.
But ten days into the battle, confidence amongst the Luftwaffe’s
command was sky-high. In that, its leaders, for once, were as one.