The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

12
What to Do for the Best
CERTAINLY THE RESIDENTS of Rotterdam had been left in no doubt about the
power of the Luftwaffe. On the afternoon of 14 May, almost a hundred He
111s from KG 54 had thundered over the city in an effort to speed up the
Dutch collapse. When they had gone again, Rotterdam was a smoking mass
of rubble, its historic heart smashed from the face of the earth and unknown
numbers of Dutch citizens left dead beneath the dust and debris. Truly, it
seemed as though Armageddon had arrived. Early the following morning
the Dutch duly surrendered.
The Luftwaffe had destroyed the Spanish Basque town of Guernica,
much of Warsaw and now Rotterdam. In fact, casualties were not quite as
high as had been first feared, but some 800 lost their lives and a further
78,000 were left homeless. Nonetheless, for the doomsayers, Rotterdam’s
destruction proved all their worst fears about the power of the modern
bomber, fears that had begun with the prediction by an Italian colonel,
Giulio Douhet, that no effective defence could stop the bomber and had
been perpetuated by men in Britain like Air Marshal ‘Boom’ Trenchard and
Stanley Baldwin. But for those at the Air Ministry and at Bomber
Command it was the final justification they needed to begin a strategic
bombing offensive inside Germany.
Although the ‘medium’ bombers of Bomber Command – the Blenheims
and Battles – had been brought into action over the battlefield, there were
still sixteen squadrons of ‘heavies’, consisting of Wellingtons, Hampdens
and Whitleys – twin-engine aircraft comparable to the trio of German
bombers, although the Whitley could carry more bombs than any of the
German planes. They were 20–30 mph slower than the German bombers,
however, and experience had shown that operations in daylight in the face
of large numbers of enemy fighters would be suicidal. Under the cover of
darkness, it was a different matter, and the Air Ministry held great faith in
their ability to wreak havoc during night-time raids. Germany’s lack of raw
materials was well-known, even exaggerated by the British. Sixty per cent
of her industrial output stemmed from the dense Ruhr Valley just the other