The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

and a little over 1,500 twin- or single-engine bombers and just above 1,000
single- or twin-engine fighters. In other words, less than half what he
thought.
‘Among the high command,’ wrote General Speidel, Chief of Staff of
Luftflotte 2, ‘above all in the case of the commander-in-chief of the
Luftwaffe himself, he was only interested in the kind of strength figures he
wanted to hear and he wanted to believe.’
Of course, there was one very quick way of reducing aircraft losses, and
that was to destroy as many of the enemy’s aircraft as soon as possible.
Luftwaffe intelligence reckoned that in January 1940, the French Armée de
l’Air had around 320 bombers and 630 fighters, while the RAF had 1,122
and 918 of each. Recognizing that Britain was hardly likely to throw all its
available aircraft into France, the Luftwaffe planners were confident they
could roll over the French air force easily enough and then the RAF in
detail, by luring them a bit at a time into the fray. The Dutch and Belgian air
forces were so small that it was reckoned a short, sharp strike should see
them off.
German intelligence, however, was some way off mark. In fact, by 10
May, the French had over 5,000 aircraft of which 3,500 were combat
machines, that is, bombers and fighters. It was true that there were only 879
French operational combat aircraft along the front lines, but there were also
another 1,700 or so out of the line but combat ready and which,
theoretically, could be put into action quite quickly. That they were not at
the front on 10 May had been a deliberate policy to avoid them being
destroyed on the ground should the Luftwaffe launch surprise air attacks.
As such, it was quite a sensible idea.
German appreciation of the RAF’s strength was closer to the mark,
however. The RAF and Royal Navy had been the principal targets for
Britain’s rearmament programme, but even so there was a growing feeling
in Britain that it was all too little and too late. This was one of the main
reasons why when the ‘German hordes’, as Churchill referred to them,
launched their attack with their apparently mighty forces, so many leading
political and military figures were plunged into such despair. Privy to the
endless arguments and prevarications over rearmament that had taken place
over the past few years, they were keenly aware of Britain’s military
deficiencies. Hence their lack of confidence on 10 May.