The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

and see more clearly. Furthermore, by holding back and waiting until the
enemy drew inland, his fighters would have more time to get to these
heights while at the same time making the German fighters operate to the
limit of their fuel. He increasingly wanted to attack the enemy as they
turned back for home, a very sensible policy. Unlike the Luftwaffe High
Command, Park had a very clear picture both operationally and tactically
and was using his available resources to make the most of their potential.
There had been almost no daylight activity on 16 September and not a great
amount the day after. Squally showers, localized thunder and a few bright
intervals were not conducive to heavy air attacks, especially when the
wounds were still being licked from the previous effort.
Hitler continued to prevaricate over Operation SEALION. Around him,
his commanders were still trying to find a way of keeping their options
open. Raeder now suggested 8 October as a potential invasion date, to allow
the Luftwaffe a bit longer. Jodl, on the other hand, noted that by keeping all
the troops and transports along the Channel coast, they would continue to
draw the RAF’s bombers, which would expose them to fighter attacks under
conditions more favourable to the Luftwaffe. Furthermore, with the RAF
bombers so occupied, their raids over Germany would diminish, which
would help improve German civilian morale. It is hard to think of a more
spurious reason for keeping an invasion force at readiness.
Yet with 15 September so obviously failing to finish off the RAF, and
with the 16th a day of no action, Hitler could not possibly give the goahead,
because he could not guarantee that the right conditions would be in
place in the ten days needed between giving SEALION the green light and
it being launched. It was just too big a risk, so on the 17th he postponed the
operation again. That he refused to cancel the operation, however, showed
not his unwillingness to undertake the invasion, but rather his reluctance to
abandon the project. Defeating Britain was still of tantamount importance.
A successful invasion still offered him his best hope of achieving that, as he
well knew.
However, there was some cause for cheer. The Luftwaffe’s efforts might be
proving disappointing, but the same could not be said for Dönitz’s U-boat
arm. There were now fourteen U-boats in the Atlantic, most in the Western
Approaches to the coast of Ireland, waiting to pounce on any incoming