The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

of exploding flak could prove lethal. It was a question of luck and odds.
And every time one survived, the odds shortened.
It was not just the Blenheims that were making daily forays over
German occupied territories. The so-called heavy bombers were also flying
over, albeit at night. The RAF had still not really sorted out its bombing
strategy; bombing was still a new form of warfare and it took time to work
out the best way to conduct operations. What was clear, however, was that
the current system was not working. It was the Air Ministry that decided
what and where was bombed, while Air Marshal Portal, C-in-C Bomber
Command, was left to provide the means, when really Portal should have
been left to get on with it without interference. One of Portal’s frustrations
was that the Air Ministry kept changing its mind. One minute it wanted
enemy ports and shipping to be attacked, then it decided it should be
industrial targets once more. To its complaints that attacks had been too
dispersed and ‘patchy’, Portal argued that inaccurate bombing was not
wasted because of the ‘moral effect’ it had on Germany. The Air Ministry
did not disagree but felt that specific material destruction still had to be the
priority. Yet another directive was issued on 24 July, the third that month.
‘Recent reports and information,’ it ran, ‘have confirmed that oil is the
weakest link in Germany’s war economy, and I am to say that the
destruction of Germany’s oil resources remains the basis of the main
offensive strategy.’ It clearly did not yet know about Germany’s oil deal
with Romania.
The nub of the matter was that a gulf had developed between what the
Air Ministry would like to achieve, and what Portal and his men in Bomber
Command could in reality achieve. The Air Ministry wanted accurate,
decisive, strategic bombing against specific and legitimate war targets.
Portal, however, knew that he had neither the numbers nor the equipment
with which to achieve that aim. It was hard enough to find a target in
daylight, but it was incredibly difficult, with only primitive navigational
aids, to hit a target at night, especially when there was cloud and plenty of
flak bursting all around. Photographic and intelligence analysis of the
bombers’ efforts consistently demonstrated the inaccuracy of their
bombing. The solution was to adopt a more laissez-faire approach to
targets. Of course, they should aim to hit specific targets, but if bombs were
liberally splayed about, then the effort was not wasted because of the
psychological effect it would have on the German people below.