The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

intrigues was not to his taste. One day Spanish radio announced he was
negotiating with Hitler through the Windsors; the next British flags were
torn from the Embassy cars. ‘The rumours baffle description,’ he told his
old friend Neville Chamberlain. ‘The trouble is that in a country where
there is no free press, false reports are given far more credence than they
would be if people knew even a little of the truth, and in a city like Madrid
where the climate is very trying and the heat terrific, everybody’s nerves are
very jumpy.’ Fortunately for Britain, Hoare was surrounded by somewhat
less nervy people than himself, not least the naval attaché, Captain Alan
Hillgarth, a cool-headed spook, who was playing a perfect game of carrot
and stick with the Spanish, offering just the right amount of aid whilst
reminding them that the Royal Navy would blockade Spain in an instant
should she declare war. Still broke from the Civil War, Franco could not
afford this. In fact, the Generalissimo had presented a number of demands
to Hitler for Spanish entry on the Axis side, not least Vichy France’s
possessions in Africa. But with Britain’s attack on the French Fleet, Hitler
had hoped Pétain might declare war on Britain and so did not want to risk
jeopardizing that by handing over French territories to the Spanish. Still,
when Hoare wrote that the situation was on a knife edge, and a pretty sharp
one at that, he was not far wrong. Spain remained a serious concern.
And what about Japan and the Middle East? Churchill had assured the
Australian and New Zealand governments that should they be attacked by
Japan he would abandon the Mediterranean and send the Fleet to help them
as quickly as possible. Cool logic suggested the Middle East should be
abandoned anyway; the Suez Canal was now unreachable since the Italian
entry into the war, while nearly all Britain’s oil no longer came through
Persia and the Middle East, but from the USA. But cool logic had suggested
Britain sue for peace at the end of May, and logic had not been right then
and, as far as Churchill was concerned, was not right now with regard to the
Middle East. It would mean abandoning Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Malta and
Gibraltar. Fighting the Italians in the Mediterranean and in Africa at least
offered Britain a chance to successfully fight back. The Italians were not the
highly motivated, well-equipped force that the Germans were. Nonetheless,
it was causing him much anxiety. He had not been impressed with General
Wavell, the C-in-C Middle East, during a visit to London. Like most British
generals, he lacked the kind of optimistic and offensively minded vision of
the Prime Minister. And there were other considerations. ‘The P.M. is very