The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

to consider any terms offered by Hitler, should he put them to France and
Britain.
‘I would not join France in asking for terms,’ Churchill replied, ‘but if I
were told what the terms offered were, I would be prepared to consider
them.’
Chamberlain now suggested a compromise. Hitler would most likely
make a definite offer to France and when the French replied that Britain
was an ally and that they could not sue for peace without her, Hitler would
tell France that Britain should send delegates to the talks. In that scenario,
Chamberlain said, Britain should refuse to do so. Halifax still insisted they
should not send a flat refusal with regard to any talks to France.
And then he issued his bombshell. He told Churchill plainly what he
thought of him and threatened to resign if the Cabinet insisted on
stubbornly refusing to open any channel for talks whatsoever. This was a
thunderbolt that none of the other members had expected, least of all
Churchill. ‘I can’t work with Winston any longer,’ Halifax told one of his
Foreign Office colleagues afterwards. The split in the Cabinet was now
threatening to plunge Britain into an even deeper crisis – one that,
combined with the evacuation of the BEF, could prove catastrophic, and
could easily bring down the Government. Should that happen, then a
rudderless Britain, plunged into political turmoil, would find it very difficult
to continue the fight.
Churchill now took his Foreign Secretary out into the garden at No. 10
for a private chat. At that moment, on the afternoon of Monday, 27 May, the
fate of Britain, it seemed, depended heavily on these two men. Enormous,
world-changing decisions were being made – both in Britain and amongst
the Nazi command – by just a few men amongst all the many millions. And
to a large extent these decisions boiled down to the differing characters and
personalities of these individuals: Hitler’s megalomania and irrational
paranoia; von Rundstedt’s military failings and stubbornness; Halifax’s
patrician logic and exasperation with his Prime Minister from whom he was
so different; and Churchill’s determined belief in the rightness of the stance
he was making on behalf of his country.
Now, in the garden of No. 10, Halifax repeated his threat of resignation.
It was Churchill’s task to dissuade him. He certainly did his best to soothe
him, apologizing repeatedly and ‘full of affection’. Whether it worked or
whether it was from some other deeper sense of duty, Halifax did not resign