The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

prospects looked grim, but welcomed Tommy’s paper and hoped they might
be able to hang on for another three weeks. From their point of view, 11
Group’s airfields were in turmoil, they were struggling to keep squadrons at
strength, and their pilots were, between them, flying between fifty and sixty
hours a day to meet the hordes of enemy aircraft that continued to come
over. The reality was that Fighter Command squadrons were often in better
shape than most Luftwaffe units and their pilots were getting more chance
to rest. The Luftwaffe strength seemed so formidable because it could
choose when it attacked and was able to concentrate its forces, but in fact,
in terms of total numbers of aircraft, the gap between the RAF and Bomber
Command was closing, rather than widening as the Luftwaffe High
Command thought. Hypothetically, the RAF could have mounted a
thousand-aircraft raid on the Pas de Calais. Logistically, it would have been
impossible, but it is interesting to think what the German reaction might
have been. Dumbfounded shock, probably.
But that was not the point. To those in charge of Britain’s defence, it
seemed as though they were reaching crisis point. There was no let-up in
the number of enemy raids on the plotting tables at Bentley Priory and
Uxbridge, and now photographs by Coastal Command and reports by
Bomber Command’s Blenheims warned of huge concentrations of barges
and ships suddenly filling harbours all the way from Holland to Le Havre.
Dowding had for some time wondered when the Germans might begin
delivering massed raids that could not be parried. From the pictures of
Continental ports, and the known build-up of Luftwaffe units in the Pas de
Calais, the strong suggestion was that the hammer blow was about to come.
What worried Dowding was that they would not be able to meet that blow.
On the morning of Saturday, 7 September, Dowding called a meeting
with Park, Evill and Sholto Douglas, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. He
explained that they needed to think about what to do should Fighter
Command ‘go downhill’. His assumption was that they would soon be
unable to keep squadrons fully equipped with pilots. Certainly, if things
continued as they were, his policy of rotating squadrons would become
impossible. It also worried him that the Germans might discover how hard
hit they were – he had no idea they already believed Fighter Command to
be a spent force. He was therefore determined to keep 11 Group at full
strength come what may, but was unable to increase the numbers of
squadrons in the south-east because of the damage to airfields, the limited