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[download]13,2 Mb - Eco - Tiras

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Stages of the policy and planning process Problem setting Institutional settingProblem definition• Actors/stakeholders• Dimensions of problem• Problem theory (recourse use/state)• Future outlook/time horizonPolicy/plan formulation• Actors/stakeholders (formal/informal)• Goals, objectives, targets• Solution devised• Means proposedPolicy evaluation• Evaluation criteriaPolicy/plan implementation• Actors/stakeholders (formal/informal)• Implementation procedures• Enforcement• Coordination• Effectiveness (social acceptance, resource availability)ResourcesResourcesrequirementsby activityActivitiesActors(formal and informal)&Resource regimesFormal constraints(Laws, rules, consultations)Informal constraints(Norms of behaviour,rules of conduct, social conventions)Environment characteristicsFig. 1. Methodological framework of the interactions at principal stages of a policy and planning process(Adapted from: Briassoulis, 2004)lations and interests in particular activity-resource combinationsdetermine which goals, objectives and targetsare promoted actually for the problem solution, and whichtheory is adopted. Moreover, because by the time theproblem reaches this stage the physical setting may havechanged, the problem for which policies and plans areformulated may not coincide with that originally defined.The devised solutions result from the interactions between,on the one hand, the physical structure and spatiallevel of the problem setting and, on the other, the actorsinvolved, effective resource regimes, technology, availableinformation and scientific knowledge, the presence ofuncertainty and the broader policy and non-policy context.The influence of resource regimes is most evident at thisstage; resource users promote problem solutions compatiblewith their ownership and rights. Well-establishedresource regimes, such as land property, will produce betterdefined solutions because the rules of the game areclearer and less uncertain. In contrast, the poorly-definedor non-existent regimes at a certain spatial level will generatemore uncertain solutions or no solutions leading toneglecting, overusing or free-riding of certain resourcesthat may cause their damage. Proposed solutions may requirethe establishment of new resource regimes, wherenone exists. Extant resource regimes may also influencethe types of solutions promoted and whether these aretechnological or non-technological.Because of institutional interplay, solutions at onespatial level will bear the influence of regimes at higherlevels and affect regimes at the lower. For example, localwater use observing the national water laws has also toconform to supra-national regulations and respect the waterrights of neighboring areas. The spatial fixity of mostenvironmental resources produces a keen competitionamong potential users with incompatible interests andamong conflicting uses requiring the same resource simultaneouslyand contemporaneously. Thus, in achievingthe desired goals, the key challenges facing the design ofsolutions are a need for spatial co-ordination and optimalcombination of preferred activities. Combining mitigationand adaptation activities in confronting climate change isa classical example of the latter.Summarizing the policy/plan formulation stage,Briassoulis (2004) noted that formal and informal actors(usually the most powerful) conceive policies according totheir particular interests but not according to intrinsic characteristicsof environmental resources. Design principlesare rarely holistic from the viewpoint of resources andserve the needs of activity-related interests. Accordingly,the proposed solutions very rarely account for other actorsand for the relationships among all resources in a problemsetting. The end result is that the use of otherwiseindivisible resources is functionally compartmentalizedand becomes subject to different regimes and competentorganizations. Nevertheless, “The spatial co-ordination ofresource use and of the required means, congruent withenvironmental carrying capacity limits, is rendered problematicif not infeasible. The advanced solutions inevitablyproduce unanticipated impacts, generate winners andlosers, jeopardize the possibility of integrated resourcemanagement and, eventually, of sustainable development”(Briassoulis, 2004, p. 123).Policy/Plan Evaluation outcomes hinge crucially onthe assumptions, logic and approach to evaluation as wellas on the criteria adopted. They all are determined by the‘evaluators’ and extant resource regimes. As result, onlyselected aspects of activities and resources are evaluatedwith conflicts arising when pro-conservation and pro-developmentinterests have opposing preferences. The resourceregimes may introduce an evaluation bias if they donot emphasize a resource’s all aspects and functions; theevaluation may not account holistically for interrelationshipsamong resources and activities. Higher-level resource regimes,e.g. international treaties, may suggest criteria thatare too general or irrelevant for lower levels. The obsoleteregimes may prove useless, if not irrelevant, for evaluatingcontemporary policies and plans resulting in the evaluationthat reflects the socio-political biases.Policy/Plan Implementation. The institutional complexityis highest and its implications are most obviousat the policy and plan implementation stage. This activitydepends heavily on ‘implementers’ that include policymakers, formal policy implementers, intermediaries, lobbiesand other constituency groups, policy recipients,— 111 —

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