A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE ...

communicator presents just enough evidence of their intention without putting the
interlocutor through too much processing effort. To put this in RT terms: “[e]very
ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Wilson and
Sperber 2004:612). Provided that the ostensive stimulus presented by the communicator
is relevant enough for the interlocutor to process it, the interlocutor will then follow a
path of least effort in computing cognitive effects (i.e. working out a relevant
interpretation). Once the interlocutor’s expectation of relevance is satisfied (i.e. once
they figure out what the interpretation is), the interlocutor stops. In short, communication
is achieved through a inferential process which culminates in the interlocutor’s
appropriate interpretation. According to Wilson and Sperber, this approach to
communication (i.e. inferential pragmatics) is to be contrasted with the classical code
model which characterizes communication as the encoding of an intended message into a
signal which then must be decoded by an interlocutor who has the same copy of the code.
While utterances, they add, constitute linguistically coded evidence (necessitating
interlocutor decoding), they represent only one type of input possible within a non-
demonstrative inference process which yields an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning
(Wilson and Sperber 2004:607). As they also point out: “[t]he goal of inferential
pragmatics is to explain how the hearer infers the speaker’s meaning on the basis of the
evidence provided” (Wilson and Sperber 2004:607). A non-verbal example of this
process was offered by Wilson and Sperber, and goes like this: If someone leaves their
empty glass in your line of sight, and you then notice it, you might conclude that she
might want a drink. If, on the other hand, she deliberately waves it at you, you would
then be justified in concluding that she would like a drink (example from Wilson and
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