Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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86 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
3 Some Varieties of Explanation<br />
In the following two sections I shall explore a series of design arguments,<br />
including that which Smart takes most seriously, viz. the argument from ‘fine<br />
tuning’. I do not have equal confidence in each, in part because of my own<br />
ignorance of the relevant scientific data but also because I doubt that the<br />
current state of our philosophical development is such that we are yet in a<br />
position finally to decide upon them. The latter point arises from the variety<br />
of forms of description <strong>and</strong> explanation, a variety that the reductionism of<br />
modern philosophy has tended to obscure.<br />
With the seeming exception of the ontological argument, which maintains<br />
that it is part of the very concept of God that that concept is necessarily<br />
instantiated, all theistic arguments involve claims about causation. I shall not<br />
discuss ontological proofs because to the extent that I have a settled interpretation<br />
of them I am in essential agreement with the sorts of objections Smart<br />
presents. That said, <strong>and</strong> I believe this may have been the view of St Anselm<br />
(1033–1109) himself, ontological reasoning might have a legitimate role in<br />
philosophical theology in serving as a bridge between the conclusion – reached<br />
by non-ontological arguments – that there is a cause of things, <strong>and</strong> further<br />
claims about the nature of that cause, such as that it is perfect. 6<br />
The other sorts of arguments – from natural regularity <strong>and</strong> purpose, from contingency,<br />
from change, from the existence <strong>and</strong> nature of special features such<br />
as minds <strong>and</strong> values, <strong>and</strong> so on, are all species of causal arguments. They maintain<br />
that the natural order, or something encountered as, or inferred to be, part of<br />
it, could not exist save for the existence <strong>and</strong> efficacy of something else that is<br />
not itself part of that order (or not essentially so – for Christians believe that in<br />
the person of Jesus Christ God the Creator entered into His own creation).<br />
In antiquity <strong>and</strong> in the Middle Ages philosophers held that there were<br />
a variety of distinct types of causes. That is to say, their reflections led them<br />
to identify a range of productive factors that might be cited in descriptions or<br />
explanations. Following Aristotle these philosophers identified four causes, or<br />
four kinds of ‘because’ explanations, 7 the so-called ‘material’, ‘formal’, ‘efficient’<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘final’ causes; but this taxonomy always had the appearance of artificiality<br />
(not to say numerology: the number 4 has been held to be a ‘significant’<br />
number – but then again so have the numbers 3 <strong>and</strong> 5), <strong>and</strong> once one begins<br />
to consider the variety of statements in which one thing is explained by or<br />
related to another it is not at all clear how many basic types of ‘cause’ there<br />
may be. Consider, for example, the following: ‘6 is even because it is divisible<br />
by two’; ‘I am still alive because my heart <strong>and</strong> brain are still functioning’; ‘my<br />
heart <strong>and</strong> brain are still functioning because I am still alive’; ‘the quadrangle<br />
seems exposed because the design of the north-east corner is unresolved’;