Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 145<br />
between on the one h<strong>and</strong> the notion of objective probabilities rooted in the<br />
natures of physical systems, <strong>and</strong> on the other the idea of behavioural tendencies<br />
issuing from habitual rational agency. Physical events <strong>and</strong> human actions<br />
may both admit of a high degree of predictability without either resulting<br />
from deterministic causes. In the case of the former, reliable prediction is<br />
based on natural propensities, in the case of the latter upon rational inclinations<br />
<strong>and</strong> responses.<br />
As I argued earlier, the relation between an agent’s reasons <strong>and</strong> his actions<br />
is not in general a causal one, at least as causation is typically understood.<br />
To explain what someone is doing it is not necessary to identify something<br />
‘lying behind’ his movements – in a more or less literal interpretation of<br />
those words. Action is the exercise of rational <strong>and</strong> appetitive powers. To<br />
underst<strong>and</strong> how an agent may act freely on a given occasion one needs to ask<br />
how it is possible that a human being should act at all. Stones are moved<br />
by external forces but, as the scholastics say, agents are moved ‘from within’<br />
(ab intrinseco). What this means is something very different from the<br />
neuropsychological events envisaged by present-day causal theorists. An<br />
adequate theory of intentional behaviour needs to combine the idea of<br />
non-r<strong>and</strong>om indeterminacy with that of intelligent sources of action.<br />
We are rational animals; living things whose principles of organization <strong>and</strong><br />
functioning are ordered towards a form of life that is responsive to reason.<br />
Voluntary action is a capacity of rational agents expressed in intrinsically<br />
intelligible behaviour. When a human being acts there need be no event in<br />
the agent prior to the action <strong>and</strong> which is its immediate cause. The only<br />
required ‘source’ is the very agent whose powers are exercised thereby. In<br />
a mature human being these powers are possessed continuously even when he<br />
or she is not doing anything ‘in particular’. Thus most action calls for no<br />
explanation, for if one knows that one is dealing with a rational animal then<br />
there is no need to say why it is doing things, for animals are active by nature<br />
(even sitting quietly <strong>and</strong> sleeping are activities). Activity is the norm, <strong>and</strong><br />
most activity is normal, i.e. it is what would be expected of a reasonable<br />
human being in familiar circumstances. The first point is a general one true of<br />
all agents, rational <strong>and</strong> otherwise; but the second derives from the fact that if<br />
we say a piece of behaviour is an action then we are committed to the claim<br />
that in doing it the agent was aiming at some end (even if this was just the<br />
performance of an action of that sort). Action differs from mere movement in<br />
being purposeful, in aiming to advance an interest of the agent. This thought<br />
is what lies behind the scholastic doctrine that all action is performed under<br />
the species of the good (sub specie boni).<br />
An obvious question to ask is whether the claim is that every action is<br />
necessarily directed towards a real good or merely to what is believed by the<br />
agent to be a good. Clearly the second interpretation is weaker <strong>and</strong> may seem