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Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

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228 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />

analogical sense to that of ‘body’ as it is predicated of a piece of stone, say.<br />

Stones are bodies in as much as they are exhaustively characterized by their<br />

material properties, persons have bodies in as much as they have material<br />

attributes. A further implication of this view which is of particular relevance<br />

to theism, is that such hope as we may have for a future life depends upon the<br />

possibility of resurrection. This is one, though not the most important, reason<br />

why Christians should maintain the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ. For<br />

as St Paul writes, ‘if Christ is not raised then believers in Christ who have<br />

died are lost. . . . Christ has been raised from death, as the guarantee that<br />

those who sleep in death will also be raised’ (1 Corinthians 15: 18 <strong>and</strong> 20).<br />

Part of my case against materialism had to do with the claim that concepts<br />

cannot be identified with or reduced to natural properties (even when they are<br />

modes of presentation of them). Since these are the constituents of thought,<br />

it itself is not something physical. The question I was then concerned with<br />

was the origin of concepts (<strong>and</strong> thereby the origin of abstract thought). This<br />

brings me to the ‘Prime Thinker’ argument which can be summarized as<br />

follows:<br />

(1) Innatism <strong>and</strong> abstractionism fail as general accounts of human conceptformation<br />

(see p. 102).<br />

(2) In order to come to possess a concept: (a) one has to have a prior<br />

predisposition or potentiality to form concepts under appropriate conditions;<br />

<strong>and</strong> (b) the conditions in question have themselves to include<br />

concept possessors (thinkers).<br />

(3) Condition (b) is provided for by the influence of members of a human<br />

linguistic community.<br />

(4) The members of such a community are themselves ones who came to<br />

possess concepts.<br />

(5) Given (2) to (4) a regress ensues.<br />

(6) This regress is halted by postulating the existence of a concept possessor<br />

which did not come to possess concepts, <strong>and</strong> which is the cause of the<br />

possession of concepts by members of the human linguistic community.<br />

(7) The role identified in (6), namely that of active Prime Thinker, is provided<br />

for by God.<br />

In proposing this argument my aim was not to fashion a detailed <strong>and</strong> incontestable<br />

proof, but, first, to show that design arguments can be carried beyond<br />

the usual range of biological functioning; second, to advance a line of reasoning<br />

that should engage the interest of those familiar with contemporary<br />

philosophy of mind <strong>and</strong> language, within which the issue of thought <strong>and</strong><br />

concepts has been prominent; third, to suggest connections between this<br />

reasoning <strong>and</strong> other aspects of my broadly neo-Thomist case on behalf of

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