Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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98 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
identity but composition. Actions are more than movements; persons are<br />
more than bodies. Eliminativists <strong>and</strong> other reductive materialists are led to<br />
suppose otherwise because they bring to the issue a prior presumption that all<br />
there is, <strong>and</strong> so all that can be involved, is matter in the physicalist sense.<br />
Let me note here that while Smart is certainly a materialist he does not,<br />
I believe, go along with those who claim that it is possible, in principle, to<br />
give definitional or deductive equivalents of psychological terms, <strong>and</strong> nor does<br />
he agree with Churchl<strong>and</strong> that psychological descriptions can be eliminated.<br />
His view is that notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the impossibility of reductions or eliminations<br />
it is plausible to hold that there are no genuine mental properties, no features<br />
over <strong>and</strong> above those acknowledged by physics. How can someone defend<br />
such a view? After all if it is allowed that talk of beliefs, desires, intentions<br />
<strong>and</strong> so on is appropriate, <strong>and</strong> that it is not equivalent to talk about physical<br />
states, is this not reason to acknowledge that there are irreducible psychological<br />
attributes? Indeed, does it not involve an implicit commitment to the<br />
reality of the mental as a distinct category?<br />
If I have him aright, Smart’s view is that some kind of property dualism or<br />
mental emergentism would be the appropriate conclusion were it not for<br />
other considerations. More precisely, he believes, first, that the circumstances<br />
in which we find ourselves attributing psychological states to one another,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the styles of those attributions, encourage an identification of the former<br />
with states of the brain; <strong>and</strong> second, that we have reasons not to posit nonphysical<br />
properties, these being the sufficiency of physics <strong>and</strong> the difficulty of<br />
reconciling other sorts of facts <strong>and</strong> explanations with it.<br />
In discussing the problem of evil towards the end of chapter 1 Smart<br />
describes <strong>and</strong> defends determinism. I shall have reason to come back to both<br />
issues later; for now, however, I want to pick up what he has to say about the<br />
explanation of actions. In keeping with a widely shared view he holds that in<br />
citing an agent’s reasons we are giving causes of his actions. This will seem to<br />
support the identification of psychological with physical states if we also<br />
assume that the brain fits into the explanation of behaviour in a similar way.<br />
Let us suppose Kirsty wrote her sentence because she wanted to communicate<br />
her ideas. In writing it her body moved in various ways because of events in<br />
her brain <strong>and</strong> nervous system. Putting these two together we might conclude<br />
that there was one sequence of behaviour, describable psychologically<br />
<strong>and</strong> physiologically, <strong>and</strong> one cause (or subset of causes), specified in the first<br />
case by talk of reasons <strong>and</strong> in the second by talk of events in the central<br />
nervous system. This inference constitutes the first of the considerations against<br />
property dualism. The second is less an argument than an extended assumption.<br />
It is that physics is all we need <strong>and</strong> that since the recognition of any<br />
other kind of reality would ex hypothesi be inexplicable physicalistically, it<br />
would be at odds with physics.