Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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82 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
2 <strong>Theism</strong> <strong>and</strong> Science<br />
An important tradition within Western philosophy believes in the primacy of<br />
natural science as a guide to truth. This is sometimes met with the charge<br />
that such an allegiance amounts to ‘scientism’ – the view that the only things<br />
that ‘really’ exist are those recognized by fundamental physical theory; <strong>and</strong><br />
that the only forms of genuine knowledge are scientific ones. I shall try to<br />
show that a commitment to fundamental science as the sole arbiter of the real<br />
is indeed a form of unwarranted reductionism. But such a case has to be<br />
made. Name calling is not a method of argument, <strong>and</strong> it is no less unsatisfactory<br />
to deride atheist materialism as ‘scientistic’ than it is to abuse theist<br />
antimaterialism by calling it ‘superstitious’. If important questions are not to<br />
be begged, one has to show that a rejection of all else other than scientific<br />
ontology <strong>and</strong> epistemology is unreasonable.<br />
It might be so for a variety of reasons. First, it may be that the materialist’s<br />
arguments against other ways of thinking are fallacious; second, it may be<br />
that while they avoid fallacies they are inconclusive <strong>and</strong> that this leaves other<br />
possibilities as rational options; <strong>and</strong> third, it may be that the materialist runs<br />
into difficulties in stating <strong>and</strong> arguing for his or her own position. It may<br />
even turn out that part of what he or she wants to say only or best makes<br />
sense given certain non-materialist, non-reductionist <strong>and</strong> perhaps even theistic<br />
assumptions. I shall be returning to these several ideas at various points but at<br />
this stage let me offer a brief illustration.<br />
Smart’s belief in science involves the kind of realism mentioned above.<br />
That is to say he assumes that the best explanation of our having certain<br />
ideas about the structure of the world, such as that it is constituted by<br />
material elements located in space–time, is that these ideas are the products<br />
of a history of interactions between elements in such a world <strong>and</strong> subjects<br />
who are themselves parts of it. This view rests on a number of further<br />
assumptions. First, there is the claim that the constituents of the world are<br />
possessed of more or less determinate natures <strong>and</strong> that these are intelligible<br />
to human beings. For that to be so many things have to be true of them <strong>and</strong><br />
of us. On the side of the objects, for example, it is necessary that their<br />
intrinsic natures be relatively stable <strong>and</strong> that they be describable in qualitative<br />
<strong>and</strong> quantitative terms. Assuming that the world is dynamic, the patterns<br />
of interaction also need to exhibit a fairly high degree of regularity. Unless<br />
these various conditions obtained no sense could be made of biological,<br />
genetic, cosmological, chemical <strong>and</strong> physical theories, or of the forms of<br />
observation <strong>and</strong> experimentation out of which they have developed. Regular<br />
orbits of planets around stars <strong>and</strong> of electrons around nuclei involve stable<br />
energy levels <strong>and</strong> angles of momentum; <strong>and</strong> considerable intellectual powers