Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 83<br />
of conception, discernment <strong>and</strong> inference have been exercised in socially shared<br />
<strong>and</strong> continuous histories of scientific enquiry in order to get us to the stage<br />
we are at today.<br />
Stability, regularity <strong>and</strong> intelligibility in world <strong>and</strong> mind are underlying<br />
assumptions of even the most limited claims of scientific realism. But suppose<br />
we ask what reason we have for making these assumptions. The general<br />
answer cannot be that they are conclusions of scientific enquiry, since they<br />
are part of what makes it possible. Rather we should say that assumptions<br />
concerning the intelligibility of objects <strong>and</strong> the intelligence of subjects are<br />
preconditions of empirical enquiry revealed by reflection on thought <strong>and</strong><br />
practice. This recognition raises a number of issues including that of whether<br />
such preconditions serve to establish the existence of a God. I shall examine<br />
this in due course; but for now I only want to observe that science involves an<br />
absolutely fundamental <strong>and</strong> extensive commitment to the nature of reality;<br />
one that is presupposed rather than derived from it; <strong>and</strong> one that makes<br />
ineliminable reference to the idea that what there is is intelligible.<br />
So viewed, it should now seem odd to oppose scientific <strong>and</strong> religious ways of<br />
thinking about the nature of reality. On the contrary, it is plausible to regard<br />
them as similar; for a central idea of theism is that we <strong>and</strong> the world we<br />
inhabit constitute an objective order that exhibits intrinsic intelligibility. What<br />
is added is the claim that both the existence <strong>and</strong> the intelligibility of this<br />
order call for an explanation <strong>and</strong> that this is given by reference to a mindful<br />
creator. Thus science is faith-like in resting upon ‘credal’ presuppositions, <strong>and</strong><br />
inasmuch as these relate to the order <strong>and</strong> intelligibility of the universe they<br />
also resemble the content of a theistic conception of the world as an ordered<br />
creation. Furthermore, it seems that the theist carries the scientific impulse<br />
further by pressing on with the question of how perceived order is possible,<br />
seeking the most fundamental descriptions-cum-explanations of the existence<br />
<strong>and</strong> nature of the universe.<br />
It will not do to respond that this further search is unscientific, for that<br />
is simply to beg the question against the theist. Assuming that by ‘science’<br />
we underst<strong>and</strong> investigation of <strong>and</strong> theorizing about the empirical order,<br />
then properly scientific attitudes <strong>and</strong> interests are certainly compatible with<br />
theism. Indeed the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic doctrine of creation serves to<br />
underwrite science by assuring us that its operative assumptions of order <strong>and</strong><br />
intelligibility are correct <strong>and</strong> by providing a motivation for pure science,<br />
namely underst<strong>and</strong>ing the composition <strong>and</strong> modes of operation of a vastly<br />
complex mind-reflecting artefact.<br />
Let us pursue this approach a bit further. Smart’s version of scientific<br />
realism is reductionist. He dismisses a familiar version of the design argument<br />
on the grounds that the apparent teleology of living systems is explicable<br />
by reference to the blind <strong>and</strong> purposeless operations of evolution – r<strong>and</strong>om