12.07.2013 Views

Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

76 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />

2<br />

<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong><br />

J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />

1 Introduction<br />

It is a pleasure to find myself debating with Jack Smart an issue of<br />

fundamental theoretical <strong>and</strong> practical importance. Smart is one of the<br />

most distinguished <strong>and</strong> respected philosophers of his generation <strong>and</strong> his<br />

work has long been associated with the intellectual virtues of clarity, honesty,<br />

fairness <strong>and</strong> modesty. Early in his introduction he avows his commitment<br />

to scientific method, <strong>and</strong> more generally to the idea that ‘plausibility in the<br />

light of total science is an important guide to metaphysical truth’. I shall<br />

be discussing this idea later; but for now I note that he goes on to say that<br />

he would attempt to ‘explain or explain away putative non-scientific ways of<br />

knowing’ among which he includes appeal to ‘the assumptions of common<br />

sense’. There is some irony in this since one thing that Smart has often<br />

brought to philosophical discussions is sharp reminders of what we ordinarily<br />

believe <strong>and</strong> of what is implicit within this, reminders intended to deflate<br />

<strong>and</strong> perhaps even to refute what have seemed to him the wilder claims of<br />

metaphysics.<br />

An example of this comes later in chapter 1 where he objects to the<br />

philosophical thesis that material objects are just constructs of subjective<br />

experience, offering the counter that the best explanation of the regularities in<br />

our observation is ‘the real actual existence of the physical objects postulated<br />

by science (<strong>and</strong> also those implicit in common sense)’ – the latter emphasis is<br />

mine. When push comes to shove Smart would probably give priority to<br />

science over common sense, a policy I shall question later; but I observe that<br />

for him common sense is at least a reasonable, if not an infallible resource<br />

when it comes to assessing metaphysical theses.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!