Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

198 J.J.C. Smart
5
Further Reflections
on Atheism for the
Second Edition
J.J.C. Smart
1 Preliminary
It was suggested that these remarks should not be part of a further exchange
between John Haldane and myself, but that we independently consider additional
matters in the light of reviews of the first edition. However, it is not
practicable or desirable to consider reviews in detail. In passing I should like
to express my appreciation of the friendly tone of most reviews, and also
thanks to the more hostile reviewers for their stimulus to thought. I shall refer
to the first edition of this book as reprinted here by the abbreviation ‘FE’.
First of all, I admit to a certain lack of focus. In a debate on Atheism
and Theism this is perhaps inevitable, since the concept of God is a family
resemblance one (see FE p. 8) and so there may be as many atheisms as
theisms. I shall be concerned with the concept of God as a necessary being,
and consequently will say more about whether there is an intelligible sense of
‘necessary’ that is appropriate here. It has also been objected that I discuss
Descartes’ form of the ontological argument, in which God is defined as a
being with all perfections, and ignore what are held to be the more subtle
arguments of Anselm. Descartes, it will be remembered, made the mistake of
treating existence as a perfection (and hence as a property), whereas Anselm
was concerned with necessary existence as an attribute of God. Anselm’s
arguments are complex and indeed subtle, and there is a good deal of controversy
in the interpretation of them. It has been said that the resources of
contemporary modal logic make us better able to state Anselm’s argument in
a defensible way. So I shall say a little about Anselm which will lead on to