Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Further Reflections on <strong>Theism</strong> 237<br />
these points, one may reply to Berkeley that while whatever is thought of is<br />
conceived, this is only to say that it is engaged via a conception, <strong>and</strong> not that<br />
it is itself one; likewise whatever is thought of is ‘present to the mind’, but not<br />
necessarily as something contained within it.<br />
So far so good, but this does not refute Berkeley’s point that the realist<br />
assumption, that some things are mind-independent, is self-contradictory: for<br />
he argued that just as an object cannot be both seen <strong>and</strong> unseen, so nothing<br />
can be both conceived <strong>and</strong> unconceived. To respond to this a further distinction<br />
is called for: that between the fact of conceiving of something <strong>and</strong> the<br />
content of what is conceived – the object itself <strong>and</strong> whatever is predicated of<br />
it. It is indeed contradictory to say: ‘I can conceive of something that is<br />
unconceived of ’; for this is equivalent to saying: ‘the thing in question is both<br />
conceived of <strong>and</strong> not conceived of ’. However, it is not at all contradictory to<br />
conceive of something as existing unconceived, for in this case the fact of<br />
one’s conceiving it is not part of what is entertained or asserted. A further<br />
way of putting the point is by saying that although I may be conceiving it, it<br />
is not thereby shown to be part of an object’s nature, let along of its being, to<br />
be conceived of by me or by anyone else.<br />
These lines of reply are satisfactory so far as diffusing Berkeley’s immediate<br />
argument for the self-contradictory nature of realism, <strong>and</strong> for the thesis that<br />
the objects of thought are always ideas. They do not, though, suffice to show<br />
that he is wrong in thinking that the world is somehow constituted by our<br />
conception of it. To see what force there is in this latter suggestion consider<br />
the version of it developed with great ingenuity by Michael Dummett in<br />
connection with truth, meaning <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing. 17 Another way of expressing<br />
the realist’s assertion of the mind-independent existence of certain<br />
entities (be they particulars, properties, or the ‘world’ in its entirety, however<br />
this last is understood) is by saying that the truth or falsity of statements<br />
concerning these entities is independent of our capacity to determine whether<br />
or not they are true. This is so because, for the realist, the truth-makers,<br />
the states of affairs in which those entities feature <strong>and</strong> in virtue of which<br />
statements concerning them are true, exist <strong>and</strong> have the character they do<br />
independently of our conception of them.<br />
Arguably it is also part of the realist view that mind-independence implies<br />
the possibility of entities whose character <strong>and</strong> existence transcend the<br />
recognitional capacities of knowers. In short, there might be things of which<br />
we not only do, but of which we can know nothing. Cast in the semantic<br />
mode: there may be statements, the truth conditions of which are beyond our<br />
powers to determine or even to conceive of. This can seem no more than<br />
common sense made philosophically explicit; but if so then the problems<br />
which now arise prompt the question of whether common sense may be<br />
incoherent. For what content attaches to the idea of existents of which we