Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 137<br />
proposition or set of propositions <strong>and</strong> its vehicle or embodiment. Once that<br />
distinction is made, however, it is no longer obvious that anything that possesses<br />
reason must exercise this through the manipulation of symbols in space<br />
<strong>and</strong> time. Indeed once the separation is allowed it is no longer clear that we<br />
must speak of rationality being ‘exercised’ as opposed to being timelessly<br />
possessed. Likewise, the idea of thought conjoining <strong>and</strong> opposing various<br />
elements seems to belong to the sphere of psychology rather than to that of<br />
reason per se. Yet it is precisely reason as such, <strong>and</strong> not an empirical psychology,<br />
that we are led to ascribe to a transcendent cause on the basis of order<br />
observed in nature.<br />
8 God, Good <strong>and</strong> Evil<br />
Obviously the existence of God could not be proved if there were a sound<br />
argument to show that there is no God. Prime c<strong>and</strong>idates for such an argument<br />
are proofs from evil. The general form of these proofs is as follows:<br />
(1) The idea of God is that of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent <strong>and</strong> omniscient<br />
being.<br />
(2) If such a being existed then there would be no evil.<br />
(3) There is evil.<br />
(4) Therefore no such being (as God) exists.<br />
Any adequate assessment of this argument requires that one think a good<br />
deal about the precise content of the claims involved; <strong>and</strong> it would be fair to<br />
say that there is no general agreement on what the theist is or is not committed<br />
to in his account of the divine attributes, <strong>and</strong> of what the nature of evil<br />
might be. There are, however, a number of points to be made.<br />
First, then, it is customary to distinguish between natural <strong>and</strong> moral<br />
evils, that is to say between bad events, processes <strong>and</strong> states of affairs the<br />
existence of which is a result of the operation of natural causes, <strong>and</strong> occurrences<br />
<strong>and</strong> situations whose badness results from or consists in the thoughts<br />
<strong>and</strong> actions of intelligent beings. If I am struck by a falling branch <strong>and</strong> my<br />
neck is broken that is a natural evil; if you strike me <strong>and</strong> break my neck that<br />
is a moral one. This contrast may suggest that the evil is the same in each<br />
case – a broken neck – <strong>and</strong> that the difference lies in the varying causes; but<br />
that is not quite right. The natural evil is the misfortune (to me) of my neck<br />
being broken; the moral evil is the fact that someone should be motivated to<br />
harm me. Certainly this fact is bad news for me, but its moral badness<br />
attaches to the state of mind of my attacker – the moral evil consists in his<br />
malevolence not in my broken neck. In both cases the evil to me is a state of