Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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162 J.J.C. Smart<br />
of the universe, the fact that it exists at all. This is surely not enough for<br />
theism in any sense in which it need be distinguished from atheism. I think<br />
that <strong>Haldane</strong>’s <strong>and</strong> Aquinas’s point is that God, as they think he is proved to<br />
exist, is something only very abstractly described, for example as simple <strong>and</strong><br />
the cause of the world. As <strong>Haldane</strong> points out, the proofs are not claimed to<br />
prove a thick ‘whatness’, i.e. God as conceived by some particular religion.<br />
But <strong>Haldane</strong> rightly points out that there must be some ‘whatness’ in the<br />
conclusion. I also agree with <strong>Haldane</strong> that any worthwhile concept of God<br />
must describe God as eternal in the sense of being outside space <strong>and</strong> time, a<br />
changeless cause of change. I would add that changelessness here would be a<br />
matter not of staying the same through time but of being like the number 7,<br />
say, neither changing nor staying the same. I concede that <strong>Haldane</strong> gives<br />
a subtle <strong>and</strong> attractive form of the cosmological argument. Nevertheless I am<br />
not persuaded, for the usual reasons as adumbrated in chapter 1. I do not see<br />
how God’s thatness <strong>and</strong> whatness can be the same reality. To say this would<br />
surely be to treat ‘exists’ as though it were a predicate.<br />
The arguments that I used against the cosmological argument do not,<br />
however, depend on any extreme empiricism or positivism about meaning,<br />
which would deny any meaning to talk of the transcendental. Indeed, I think<br />
that this ascent to the transcendental can happen in science when meaning is<br />
transferred upward through the hypothetico-deductive method, <strong>and</strong> further<br />
through considerations of simplicity when the empirical evidence is indecisive.<br />
Hence I do go a long way to agree with the remarks about meaning <strong>and</strong><br />
the transcendental (see p. 134). My objection to the hypothesis of theism is<br />
the unclarity of the notion of necessity that would be required. On p. 135<br />
<strong>Haldane</strong> perhaps rightly objects that I give insufficient attention to the way<br />
in which the notion of necessity arises in the argument from contingency.<br />
He says that ‘what we are led to is the existence of something which exists<br />
eternally, which does not owe its being to anything else <strong>and</strong> which cannot not<br />
exist’. The nub is in the last clause. Following Quine, my notion of modality<br />
is highly contextual. Except for mere logical necessity, where the background<br />
assumptions are null, the notion of ‘can’ is relative to these background assumptions.<br />
‘It cannot be the case that p’ can be said when mutually agreed background<br />
assumptions imply (by first order logic) that not-p. For example, ‘you<br />
cannot live without oxygen’ can be said because ‘you do not live without<br />
oxygen’ follows from agreed assumptions about human physiology. Perhaps<br />
the background assumptions could be assumptions of theological theory, or<br />
‘necessary’ here be a primitive of that theory. This, however, would make<br />
theology question-begging <strong>and</strong> ready to be sliced off by Ockham’s razor.<br />
As I pointed out in chapter 1, the universe could fill the bill of something<br />
that does not require anything else for its existence. According to the atheist<br />
there is nothing beyond the universe <strong>and</strong> so it is not dependent on anything