Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Further Reflections on <strong>Theism</strong> 241<br />
the hypothesis that there is a God, I take it to refute the assumption that<br />
God is complex. Some hold that the very idea of God offers no sense. This<br />
might be understood in three ways: first, that no content can be attached to<br />
the term ‘God’; second, that such purported content as is claimed for it is in<br />
fact nonsensical; <strong>and</strong> third, that while the content given it is not incoherent<br />
in this last respect, it nevertheless contains one or more inconsistencies.<br />
The worries about the idea of God, voiced by Smart <strong>and</strong> shared by some<br />
reviewers, are, I think, a combination of the first <strong>and</strong> the third of these.<br />
They find no suitable content in the claim that God’s existence is necessary;<br />
<strong>and</strong> think that the suggestion that God is simple is incompatible with the<br />
idea that he is the designer of the complex cosmos.<br />
I held that the argument from contingency leads us to ‘the existence of<br />
something which exists eternally, which does not owe its being to anything<br />
else <strong>and</strong> which cannot not exist’ (p. 135). It was observed, correctly, that the<br />
last clause deploys a notion of modal existence <strong>and</strong> hence fails to be informative<br />
to anyone already puzzled by the idea of existential necessity. Smart’s own<br />
position is not that the very notion of ‘necessity’ is hopelessly obscure but that<br />
the various ways in which it might be clarified are unhelpful to the theist.<br />
Considering logical, natural <strong>and</strong> mathematical necessity, the first is dismissed<br />
on the grounds that were ‘God exists’ logically necessary, then its negation<br />
would be logically contradictory <strong>and</strong> hence the ontological argument would<br />
be sound. Since I agree that Anselm’s argument fails, I accept that the claim<br />
that ‘God exists’ is not logically necessary in the formal sense envisaged by<br />
Smart <strong>and</strong> endorsed by others. Physical necessity as required by natural laws<br />
<strong>and</strong> cosmological boundary conditions will not do either, since ex hypothesi<br />
God is the transcendent cause of nature. So far as concerns mathematical<br />
necessity Smart considers that traditional mathematical Platonism with its<br />
ontology of numbers <strong>and</strong> other abstract entities ‘which exist eternally <strong>and</strong> in<br />
some sense necessarily’ (p. 42) may offer the best hope for the theist’s idea of<br />
necessary existence. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, contemporary mathematical<br />
Platonists have little to say about the necessary existence of numbers, <strong>and</strong><br />
Smart is to be appreciated for engaging the issue. 21 He has, nonetheless, two<br />
objections to such a theory. Firstly, it is unclear how the material mind could<br />
be acquainted with abstract entities; secondly, other than in the strict logical<br />
case already allowed for, modality is a matter of derivability from an agreed<br />
set of background assumptions. These points are evidently question-begging.<br />
The first concerns epistemology not ontology <strong>and</strong> presumes a view of mind<br />
that many (theists <strong>and</strong> non-theists alike) would reject; the second just reasserts<br />
a contextualist metalinguistic account. All the same, Smart <strong>and</strong> others are<br />
right to press the issue of how I conceive the necessary being of God in<br />
order that (a) it makes sense, <strong>and</strong> (b) it is not such that the existence of the<br />
world itself could be necessary in just the same sense.