Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
166 J.J.C. Smart<br />
create many universes, why not many universes which contain no positive<br />
evils? This thought does not undermine <strong>Haldane</strong>’s position if one accepts his<br />
view that evil is not something positive but only a privation of good. Now the<br />
death of the mouse may be a privation in so far as it consists in the absence of<br />
the anticipated future life <strong>and</strong> growing to maturity of the mouse. But what<br />
of the actual terror <strong>and</strong> painful death throes of the mouse? I find it hard to<br />
think of this as consisting of mere privation.<br />
<strong>Haldane</strong> distinguishes natural <strong>and</strong> moral evils. Moral evils consist in the<br />
thoughts <strong>and</strong> actions of intelligent beings (see p. 137). They arise from<br />
the misuse of free will. Of course from my naturalistic point of view there is<br />
a sense in which moral evils are a species of natural evil. Hitler <strong>and</strong> Goebbels<br />
were horrible, but for a naturalist there is nothing puzzling about this. There<br />
are more ways for a thing to go wrong than to go right. We inherit atavistic<br />
parts of our brains, <strong>and</strong> the cortex itself can easily get wired up in peculiar<br />
ways. For the theist there is a puzzle <strong>and</strong> <strong>Haldane</strong> tries to resolve this by<br />
reference to freedom of will. Freedom of will, he holds, is a great good but<br />
essentially carries with it the possibility of wrongdoing.<br />
In my main essay I defended, near enough, a compatibilist account of free<br />
will. <strong>Haldane</strong> disagrees with this, as I think that he must if he is to deploy the<br />
free will defence to account for the possibility of God allowing a universe<br />
with moral evil in it. If the compatibilist position is correct we can go on to<br />
ask why God did not create a universe in which moral beings were given such<br />
strong motives to aim at the right that they would always do so. (They may<br />
fail actually to do the right because of non-culpable factual ignorance or<br />
mistake, but this would not constitute moral evil.) Would we lack free will if<br />
we had a passionate <strong>and</strong> overwhelming desire to do the right? I find it odd to<br />
answer this question in the affirmative. Is a person’s engaging in symbolic<br />
logic the less free the greater is his or her enjoyment of it?<br />
Thus I hold that even if God had planted in us motives which always<br />
caused us to aim at the right this would not be in contradiction to our having<br />
free will. Let us recall my remarks, in my main essay, about the article by<br />
R.E. Hobart. We need to have at least an approximation to determinism in<br />
the working of our minds (our central nervous systems) for free will to be<br />
possible. Otherwise it would be mere chance what we did. I can concede that<br />
the compatibilist theory of free will, as in Hobart, does not give us everything<br />
that the person in the street wants from the concept of free will, since he or<br />
she wants something logically impossible, both to be determined <strong>and</strong> not<br />
determined, but I hold that compatibilism can, properly argued, give us all we<br />
should want or need for practical <strong>and</strong> legal purposes. <strong>Haldane</strong> proposes to go<br />
between the horns of the dilemma.<br />
‘When a human being acts’, says <strong>Haldane</strong>, ‘there need be no event in<br />
the agent prior to the action <strong>and</strong> which is its immediate cause’ (see p. 145).