Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Further Reflections on <strong>Theism</strong> 233<br />
extra-mental over <strong>and</strong> above a set of individuals provides the meaning of<br />
a general term. The ‘anti-realist’, by contrast, insists that the world contains<br />
nothing but individuals <strong>and</strong> that all generalization is the work of the mind.<br />
Depending on how these positions are further developed, one may begin to<br />
wonder whether they might not in fact be contraries rather than contradictories;<br />
i.e. one may suspect that both are false. Suppose one holds that some general<br />
terms, those of natural kinds, answer to objective universal natures but that<br />
others, reflecting specific sensibilities or interests, do not. How is this to be<br />
fitted into the initial opposition? Or suppose one thinks, as did Aquinas, that<br />
natural species terms have a dual semantics, signifying abstracted universal<br />
natures in the intellect <strong>and</strong> particular individual natures extra-mentally. Where<br />
does this position st<strong>and</strong> in relation to realism <strong>and</strong> anti-realism?<br />
The fact is that some formulations of realism <strong>and</strong> anti-realism overlook<br />
the possibility that, as conceived, both may be false. In other words philosophers’<br />
uses of the term ‘the world’ are not univocal but the expression moves<br />
between two sets of poles. On the one h<strong>and</strong> there is the contrast between<br />
philosophical <strong>and</strong> popular uses of the term ‘world’. The latter is ontologically<br />
fairly undiscriminating, the former relatively fastidious. On the other h<strong>and</strong><br />
there is the contrast within philosophy between narrow <strong>and</strong> broader uses. The<br />
first relates to what it is supposed exists universally or singularly, <strong>and</strong> independent<br />
of our sense <strong>and</strong> intellect. The second relates to categories fashioned<br />
by us, to which there is no corresponding natural unity.<br />
There is scope, then, for debating whether the original characterization of<br />
realism <strong>and</strong> anti-realism was adequate. Once it has been settled what the<br />
preferred form of realism should be, however, <strong>and</strong> so long as the statement of<br />
anti-realism preserves univocality, then the opposition will indeed be between<br />
contradictories. In summary, I take realism to be the thesis that with respect<br />
to some significant specifiable core the world <strong>and</strong> its basic structure are mindindependent,<br />
<strong>and</strong> take anti-realism to be the denial of this. What, now, of<br />
premisses (2) <strong>and</strong> (3), each of which links the metaphysical antecedent to the<br />
existence of God? The move from realism to theism is explored in arguments<br />
from contingency or order to the existence of a first cause of existence or of<br />
design. Such arguments begin, as in Aquinas’s quinque viae, with observation<br />
of some fact or facts taken to be generally evident in experience. Recall that in<br />
introducing the first way Aquinas writes of how ‘it is certain, <strong>and</strong> evident to<br />
our senses, that in the world some things are in process of change’. Presenting<br />
the second he writes that ‘in the world of sensible things we find there is an<br />
order of efficient causes’. Introducing the third he says that ‘we find in nature<br />
things that are possible to be <strong>and</strong> not to be’. Presenting the fourth he notes<br />
that ‘among beings there are some more <strong>and</strong> some less good, true, noble, <strong>and</strong><br />
the like’. Finally, in giving the fifth way he writes of how ‘we see that things<br />
which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end’ (my emphasis). 11