Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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44 J.J.C. Smart<br />
beliefs, even though this reason is not interpersonally persuasive. The believer<br />
may think that these experiences enable him or her to cope better with the<br />
problems of life, <strong>and</strong> perhaps become a better person. The idea that this may<br />
constitute an intellectually respectable reason for belief is connected with James’s<br />
pragmatism, which assimilates the notion of truth to that of the useful or<br />
what works. I do not think that it is necessary nowadays to take up space in<br />
refuting this confused notion of truth. This is not, however, to say that we<br />
can totally ignore pragmatic considerations, as in the well-known matter of<br />
Pascal’s Wager, which I shall consider shortly.<br />
When people talk of religious ‘experience’, the word ‘experience’ tends to<br />
be somewhat protean in meaning. In the first place, they may be claiming<br />
that they have something like perception. However, there are clearly no special<br />
religious sensations as there are visual, auditory <strong>and</strong> tactual sensations.<br />
Nor do they correlate with interpersonally perceptible situations, as visual,<br />
auditory <strong>and</strong> tactual sensations do. Furthermore, in the last century or two<br />
there has come to be increasing physical <strong>and</strong> neurophysiological knowledge<br />
of how perception works. There is nothing like this in the case of religious<br />
experience, at least if this is thought of as a sort of spiritual perception. Do<br />
spiritual photons come from God to some neurophysiological organ? Perhaps<br />
this is an unfair question. God might be everywhere, even in the synapses of<br />
the brain, <strong>and</strong> in the previous section I have played with a notion of how an<br />
external (atemporal) being might be said to act on the world. Still, there does<br />
remain some difficulty in seeing sense perception as a fit model for the notion<br />
of religious experience.<br />
Experience of God has sometimes been described as the feeling that there<br />
is a ‘presence’. This feeling is not connected with a special perceptual sensation.<br />
Thus two explorers in the wilderness may say to one another that they<br />
feel that there is someone nearby whom they cannot see. In fact they know<br />
that no other explorer or native of the region is nearby. Nevertheless,<br />
I suppose, the feeling can be strong <strong>and</strong> shared interpersonally. A psychologist<br />
would put it down to an illusion brought on by loneliness <strong>and</strong> privation.<br />
Similarly a vague feeling of a Presence, such as some mystics have reported,<br />
need not be taken as veridical. If a person of mystical bent does take it<br />
as veridical, a sceptic need not accept the mystic’s claim. The principle of<br />
theoretical economy favours the sceptic’s explanation in terms of some sort<br />
of illusion. Not that the sceptic will convince the mystic. At the beginning of<br />
this essay I put forward scientific plausibility as a guide in metaphysics <strong>and</strong><br />
the mystic will refuse to go all the way with this guide. There is thus likely to<br />
be deadlock here. At any rate I think that the sceptic can say this, that<br />
religious experience provides no objective warrant for religious belief unless<br />
the possibility of a naturalistic explanation of the experience can be ruled out<br />
as implausible, <strong>and</strong> it is hard to see how this requirement could be met.