Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Reply to Smart 181<br />
Recall that I rejected the view favoured by Smart, <strong>and</strong> championed by<br />
Davidson, 7 that action is behaviour caused by antecedent mental states –<br />
‘reasons’. There are two broad categories of considerations against the identification<br />
of reasons with causes: the first is that nothing about the rational<br />
explanation of action requires this identification; the second is that the nature<br />
of action explanation prohibits it. Smart has the latter concern in mind when<br />
he writes that we must distinguish ‘reason’ as cause <strong>and</strong> ‘reason’ as justification.<br />
He thinks it would be a mistake to pass from the fact that justifying<br />
reasons are normative propositions (e.g. the truth of ‘it is wrong to lie’ is a<br />
‘reason’ not to lie) to the conclusion that they cannot be causes, for what is<br />
cited in explanation of behaviour is not the truth of the proposition but the<br />
agent’s belief in or endorsement of it. I agree this would be a faulty inference,<br />
but it does not feature in my anti-causalist view of reasons. My argument as<br />
presented above (chapter 2, pp. 100ff ) has to do with the difficulty of conceiving<br />
of the relation between beliefs, desires <strong>and</strong> other mental attitudes <strong>and</strong><br />
actions as being a causal one.<br />
It was in response to the question of how the connection between them<br />
should be understood, if not causally, that I introduced the scholastic phrase<br />
‘moved from within’. 8 This troubles Smart because the only relevant ‘inside’<br />
from his point of view is that defined in relation to the skull. It may help if<br />
I explain that the origin of this phrase lies in a contrast marked in Aristotelian<br />
thinking about the movements of objects, between those whose behaviour is<br />
to be explained in terms of forces acting upon them, <strong>and</strong> those which are<br />
originating sources of movement in their own right. This is not the distinction<br />
between mere behaviour <strong>and</strong> rational action since there may be internal<br />
principles of non-rational agency. Rather it relates to the issue of whether<br />
some behaviour is expressive of the nature of the thing in question or is an<br />
effect imposed upon it.<br />
Among the things there are, are natural substances, that is, unified subjects<br />
of predication. Such substances have characteristic powers of action <strong>and</strong> reaction;<br />
<strong>and</strong> sometimes their names <strong>and</strong> descriptions indicate these powers.<br />
Thus if we hear that something is an ‘acid’ we know that in certain sorts of<br />
circumstances (which we may not be able to specify) it will exert a corrosive<br />
effect. Similarly if we know that something is an ‘animal’ then we know that<br />
it has organic powers, typically ones of metabolism, growth <strong>and</strong> reproduction.<br />
In explaining an occurrence by mentioning its agent we are adverting to the<br />
operation of such powers as providing a full <strong>and</strong> adequate account. It is a<br />
mistake, I believe, to assume that if a substance is cited as the cause of an<br />
event the latter must, as a matter of logic or metaphysics, be due to some<br />
other event or events having taken place literally inside the agent. What it is<br />
to be an agent is to be possessed of certain powers with natural tendencies<br />
to exercise them in appropriate circumstances. Certainly, if such power is