Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 101<br />
allowing that reality can be, as it seems to be, composed of various distinct<br />
sorts of things constituted at different levels. Unsurprisingly, therefore, I see<br />
no reason to suppose that the explanation of the intentional behaviour of<br />
rational animals conforms to a single pattern. In particular, I see no need to<br />
subsume every factor that might be adverted to in psychological explanation<br />
under a heading termed ‘rational causation’. Consider again the scene in<br />
which Kirsty is writing a sentence <strong>and</strong> we ask ourselves why she is doing this.<br />
The answer I proposed was that she wants to communicate her ideas, but<br />
many other explanations might be offered: she is in a creative mood; she has<br />
promised to produce a story; she has ab<strong>and</strong>oned pencil <strong>and</strong> paper <strong>and</strong> is<br />
experimenting with a word processor; she doesn’t have the time to write a<br />
whole page, <strong>and</strong> so on. Notice that these need not compete with one another;<br />
they could all be true. Notice also that in many cases the explanation takes<br />
the form of a redescription of the actual behaviour, not a move away from it<br />
to describe something else to which it is only contingently related – an<br />
ontologically independent antecedent cause. To say ‘she is writing because<br />
she wants to communicate’ need not be held to identify some event of wanting<br />
to communicate which led to this behaviour; rather it can be viewed as<br />
interpreting the behaviour as communicative. Here the wish to underst<strong>and</strong><br />
what is going on is satisfied by being told what the agent is doing. No<br />
mention of antecedent events is necessary. While one may say ‘she is writing<br />
because . . .’ I have argued that it is a mistake to regard this as necessarily<br />
introducing an efficient cause, even though it sometimes may do.<br />
In order to act an agent must be able to deliberate, considering the pros<br />
<strong>and</strong> cons of alternative courses. In doing so, he or she is not reflecting upon<br />
actual events but possible ones. Possible events are always types; the only<br />
token events there are are actual ones. So in thinking about what to do one is<br />
entertaining general descriptions: ‘writing an essay’, ‘cutting the grass’, ‘polishing<br />
the silver’, ‘changing the baby’, ‘phoning a friend’, <strong>and</strong> so on. Unless<br />
we could think in terms of types we could not deliberate, <strong>and</strong> without being<br />
able to deliberate we could not act. It is also true that when we think about<br />
the present <strong>and</strong> the past we consider events through the mediation of general<br />
categories. Even where the object of thought is a particular, the content of<br />
the thought will be constructed out of general concepts (whether thoughts are<br />
wholly general in content is a matter of dispute). If I think of my wife Hilda<br />
I think of someone who is a woman, a mother, a Scot, <strong>and</strong> so on; <strong>and</strong> while she<br />
is a unique individual these attributes are general <strong>and</strong> can be multiply instantiated<br />
– many individuals are Scottish women, wives <strong>and</strong> mothers.<br />
Thinking about the future is only ever thinking in general terms, <strong>and</strong><br />
thinking about the present involves bringing individuals under general types.<br />
In short, thinking involves universal concepts. This fact creates problems<br />
for materialism <strong>and</strong> for the effort to show that human beings could have