Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
164 J.J.C. Smart<br />
nature but my motives have nothing to do with a desire to block cosmological<br />
proofs. See <strong>Haldane</strong>’s remark on p. 123. I would love to have a<br />
cosmological proof if I found it convincing. I do feel the force of the question<br />
‘Why is there anything at all?’ even though I seem to see that it could have<br />
no possible answer.<br />
I worry still about the notion of God’s simplicity, the assertion of which is<br />
an important part of the argument. Can there be a simple cause of a complex<br />
world? Perhaps there could be if simplicity is just a matter of the ultimate<br />
laws of nature (or for <strong>Haldane</strong> the attributes of God) hanging together in a<br />
nice way, such as is hoped for by those physicists who search for a final theory<br />
uniting physics <strong>and</strong> cosmology. Still, the laws or attributes must be distinct:<br />
they cannot follow from one another as a pure matter of logic. <strong>Haldane</strong> refers<br />
to the distinction between sense <strong>and</strong> reference. Now the words ‘is powerful’<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘is good’, for example, have different senses <strong>and</strong> different references. So<br />
we might say, Platonistically, that the attributes of power <strong>and</strong> of goodness are<br />
different attributes <strong>and</strong> indeed apply to different sets of objects. Different<br />
sense, different reference. However, the attributes of infinite power <strong>and</strong> infinite<br />
goodness, according to the theist, apply to one <strong>and</strong> only one object, namely<br />
God. This still, as far as I can see, leaves the attributes distinct: as a matter of<br />
logic the possession of one attribute does not imply the possession of any of<br />
the others. Indeed theorists who deny the existence of God because of the<br />
existence of evil do so by supposing an incompatibility between the conjunction<br />
of observed evil with the simultaneous possession of the two attributes of<br />
infinite power <strong>and</strong> infinite goodness.<br />
This leads me to pass a few remarks on <strong>Haldane</strong>’s treatment of this problem<br />
of evil. I do not hope to get agreement with him on this matter, any<br />
more than on the cogency or otherwise of the Aquinas–<strong>Haldane</strong> argument<br />
for the existence of God. The reader must weigh up the two sides of this<br />
‘Great Debate’, <strong>and</strong> make up his or her mind, <strong>and</strong> ideally do so in the light<br />
of further reading.<br />
6 <strong>Theism</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Problem of Evil<br />
I do not wish to add a great deal to the treatment of the problem of evil in my<br />
main essay, except to take account of certain features special to John <strong>Haldane</strong>’s<br />
interesting theodicy in his main essay. He rightly rejects suggestions that evil<br />
is an illusion. Even the illusion of evil would be horrible. Still, he has a<br />
reservation here. He holds that though evil is not illusory, it is not something<br />
positive in the world but is rather a privation. It is something that impedes<br />
something positive, the proper functioning of a thing. In chapter 1, I questioned<br />
the intelligibility, in the light of the theory of evolution, of the notion