Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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230 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
the stages of linguistic development, cannot account for conceptual thought<br />
as this is instanced by, <strong>and</strong> expressed through language.<br />
Here I should emphasize that I conceive the primary inductive causal role<br />
of a concept-possessor not to be one impressing concepts in the mind of a<br />
patient, but rather of occasioning in the patient the power of concept formation.<br />
Such teaching is in the first instance, <strong>and</strong> primarily, a process of enabling-tomake-intelligible<br />
by triggering potentialities for abstraction <strong>and</strong> by influencing<br />
the directions of these. Language is an important but not the only vehicle<br />
of this process. Some critics have suggested that the ability to acquire concepts<br />
<strong>and</strong>/or language could be induced by encounter with objects falling under<br />
the relevant ideas/terms; or that the role of intelligent language users might<br />
be taken by baby-raising robots which (though mindless) make appropriate<br />
noises in consequence of which the babies grow up thinkers. As I indicated,<br />
the issues are vast; let me just say that the first hypothesis looks like a return<br />
to the innatism or to the abstractionism I rejected; while the second fails to<br />
engage the issue of concepts involving modes of presentation transcendent<br />
of natural properties. Conceptually-informed language teaching is no more a<br />
matter of making the ‘right noises’ than is weeping for a loved one, or identifying<br />
one <strong>and</strong> the same figure as being both a triangle <strong>and</strong> a trilateral.<br />
Wittgenstein wrote ‘in use [a sign] is alive. Is life breathed into it there? – Or<br />
is the use its life?’. 9 He meant to commend the latter, I answer ‘both’; 10 but<br />
either of the options he gives st<strong>and</strong> opposed to the idea that ‘noises’ might<br />
constitute the activating condition of conceptually structured language.<br />
Returning to the character of the overall argument, having introduced it<br />
in the section on teleological reasoning, but then associating it with Aquinas’s<br />
first way, <strong>and</strong> structuring things in terms of a series of language users, some<br />
confusion arose as to whether it should be interpreted as a design or<br />
cosmological proof, <strong>and</strong> whether the causal series was to be understood as<br />
per accidens or per se. So far as the first issue is concerned, my point was that<br />
insofar as the argument involves actuality <strong>and</strong> potentiality it is conformable<br />
to a proof in terms of the coming-into-being of an antecedent possibility,<br />
<strong>and</strong> of the necessity for this movement of a cause that is purely actual in<br />
the relevant respect; but that at the same time the argument concerns a<br />
phenomenon that exhibits intrinsic teleological order <strong>and</strong> hence suggests<br />
design. Concepts give thoughts their content, making them to be about such<br />
<strong>and</strong> such; thoughts express beliefs <strong>and</strong> desires which are directed towards the<br />
(presumed to be) true <strong>and</strong> the good, respectively. In short, the issue has two<br />
aspects, each of which gives rise to an argument to God. Once recognized,<br />
this point can be extended beyond the particular case. Indeed if, as I believe,<br />
any living thing is analysable in terms of its efficient cause, matter, form<br />
<strong>and</strong> function, then its existence <strong>and</strong> activity will generate a range of interconnected<br />
reasonings to God.