Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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30 J.J.C. Smart<br />
with a neurophysiological account of the mind. The intuition of goodness or<br />
rightness would not be at all like vision, where we have a theory of photons<br />
striking the eye <strong>and</strong> thus affecting the nervous system. However, Leslie differs<br />
from Moore <strong>and</strong> Ross because he denies that we intuit or know facts about<br />
goodness <strong>and</strong> rightness. We believe the axiarchic principle because we conjecture<br />
it, <strong>and</strong> part of our conjecture is that it is certainly effective <strong>and</strong> explains<br />
the existence <strong>and</strong> design of the world. Leslie draws an analogy between<br />
ethical <strong>and</strong> causal requiredness. He holds that the ethical uses of words such<br />
as ‘must’, ‘have to’, ‘are required to’, have ‘more than punning similarities’ to<br />
their causal uses. In this way Leslie thinks that his theory of ethics can be<br />
objectivist without requiring the postulation of mysterious ethical intuitions.<br />
He also thinks that the analogy between ethical <strong>and</strong> causal requirements<br />
overcomes the already mentioned problem for objectivists of the sort of Moore<br />
<strong>and</strong> Ross, that you might intuit that an action is good or right while feeling<br />
no motive to do it. So perhaps Leslie’s own br<strong>and</strong> of objectivism about the<br />
ethical principle overcomes the main objections to non-naturalistic ethics<br />
such as that of Moore <strong>and</strong> Ross.<br />
Leslie’s principle, then, is conjectural, something like a scientific hypothesis,<br />
<strong>and</strong> accepted by argument to the best explanation. But is it the best<br />
explanation or even a good explanation? We may accept that there is some<br />
analogy between the ‘must’ of ethics <strong>and</strong> the ‘must’ of causal law statements,<br />
but there is much disanalogy too. It is notorious that ‘ought’ does not imply<br />
‘is’. If it did the world would be a better place. Leslie would reply that, despite<br />
appearances to the contrary, the world is the best that is logically possible<br />
granted the value of free will, <strong>and</strong> in the case of natural evils, granted the fact<br />
that ‘satisfaction of all ethical requirements simultaneously may well be logically<br />
impossible’ (ibid., pp. 82–3). He acknowledges that we have no reason to<br />
like this fact. Seeing a child in pain we need not comfort ourselves with cosy<br />
Panglossian optimism. Here of course we are in the midst of theodicy <strong>and</strong><br />
‘the problem of evil’, which I shall discuss in a later section.<br />
Thus the question ‘Why is the universe as it is?’ (e.g. ‘Why the “fine<br />
tuning”?’) is answered by ‘Because it is good that it is’. This is nearer to being<br />
an answer to the question ‘Why is the universe as it is?’ than it is to the<br />
question ‘Why does anything exist at all?’ If the principle is to do the latter<br />
job it has antecedently (in a logical, not a temporal sense) to exist itself, <strong>and</strong><br />
we are back to the ‘Who made God?’ type of problem. Perhaps it could be<br />
said that the axiarchic principle, like God, would be a necessary being. Whatever<br />
a principle is, perhaps a proposition, the question of whether a proposition<br />
is necessary truth must be distinguished from the question of whether<br />
the proposition exists. Do we need to postulate propositions? It is already<br />
doubtful in what sense the axiarchic principle expresses a necessary truth,<br />
<strong>and</strong> doubtful also whether the existence of such a proposition could itself be