Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 135<br />
the concepts in question, viz. change, causation, contingency, necessity, purpose,<br />
thought, action <strong>and</strong> so on, are not specific to natural theology <strong>and</strong> nor is the<br />
manner of their use in the proofs unique to that context.<br />
Consider briefly the following supposedly troublesome examples: causation,<br />
necessity, thought <strong>and</strong> action. It has often been argued that our only idea of<br />
causation is that of the link between efficient causes <strong>and</strong> their effects, <strong>and</strong><br />
that this is a form of law-governed relationship between contingent <strong>and</strong><br />
independent entities. If this were so, then indeed the proofs would be fallacious;<br />
for given what the theist claims about God <strong>and</strong> the dependency of the<br />
world on his creative activity, they would involve equivocation in the use of<br />
the central terms. For example, ‘cause’ when predicated of God simply could<br />
not mean what it means when predicated of a material object. However, as<br />
I have argued above, the core notion of a cause is simply that of a productive<br />
factor – that which makes something to be the case – <strong>and</strong> there is nothing in<br />
this idea alone that implies laws, contingency <strong>and</strong> independence. Of course, if<br />
the world is caused to be by that which we call God, this relationship is not<br />
to be assimilated to the mechanical operation of one object upon another; but<br />
why should the theist, or anyone else for that matter, want to circumscribe<br />
the idea of causation in this way?<br />
Likewise, there has been an inadequate constraining of possibilities in<br />
discussions of necessity <strong>and</strong> contingency. Happily, since the late 1960s the<br />
old idea that the only necessities are linguistic or logical has fallen under<br />
suspicion <strong>and</strong> come to be widely ab<strong>and</strong>oned in favour of the view that there<br />
can be existential or de re necessities. In chapter 1 Smart raises worries about<br />
how the idea of God’s existence can be fitted into any of the various categories<br />
of necessity he discusses, but I think he gives insufficient attention to the<br />
way in which the idea of necessity arises in the argument from contingency.<br />
What we are led to is the existence of something which exists eternally,<br />
which does not owe its being to anything else <strong>and</strong> which cannot not exist.<br />
One might well ask ‘Is there any such thing?’; but this notion of necessary<br />
existence is not incoherent, <strong>and</strong> if I am right then reason will require us to<br />
apply it once we begin to ask about how to explain the existence of anything<br />
that is contingent, i.e. not necessary in this sense.<br />
Causation <strong>and</strong> necessity are not obviously person-involving features as are<br />
thought <strong>and</strong> action; <strong>and</strong> it may be conceded that while the former can be<br />
deployed intelligibly in the direction of the transcendent, any such use of the<br />
latter must lead to incoherence. As before, my illustration <strong>and</strong> response will<br />
be brief. The upshot of the reasoning from effect to cause in the case of<br />
teleological or design proofs, particularly in their ‘old’ versions, <strong>and</strong> of the<br />
‘Prime Thinker’ argument, is the conclusion that the operation of the world<br />
<strong>and</strong> of human beings within it depends upon the purposeful agency of a<br />
transcendent mind. To this we could now add the sort of reasoning given