Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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106 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
me to elaborate my objection. What needs to be accounted for is a natural<br />
transition from the non-conceptual to the conceptual <strong>and</strong> that is not the same<br />
distinction as one between degrees of conceptual complexity. Doubtless Stone<br />
Age cave dwellers made fewer <strong>and</strong> less abstract discriminations than a contemporary<br />
physicist, but that is irrelevant; the point is that the ability to make<br />
any general classifications is a conceptual power.<br />
Let me add a further consideration in this cumulative case against naturalism.<br />
Thus far I have cast my objections concerning the nature of thought in<br />
terms of the genesis of concepts. However, there is an additional difficulty for<br />
the materialist or physicalist so far as concerns the relation between concepts<br />
<strong>and</strong> the objects <strong>and</strong> features that fall under them. Consider again the concept<br />
cat. Setting aside issues having to do with its non-specificity <strong>and</strong> possible<br />
indeterminacy (e.g. there are significant differences between species of cats<br />
<strong>and</strong> there may be animals concerning which it is an issue whether they even<br />
are cats) let us say that the extension of this concept (the things of which it is<br />
true), or of the corresponding term ‘cat’ <strong>and</strong> its equivalents in other languages,<br />
is the set of cats.<br />
Smart discusses the need to allow sets into his otherwise materialist ontology<br />
but I am concerned to argue that in the present case this admission is an<br />
insufficient concession to non-materialism. It is natural to think that the<br />
concept cat designates not only actual cats but future <strong>and</strong> ‘counterfactual’ cats.<br />
That is to say, one might contemplate <strong>and</strong> discuss with others the prospects<br />
for cats in the environment of Chernobyl 30 years hence, or consider<br />
what would have been done with the kittens that Mother Cat might have<br />
had had she not been neutered. Thus there is a problem with the attempt<br />
to give the ‘semantic value’ of this term, or concept, by reference to actual<br />
material objects. Additionally, it is easily imaginable that the members of<br />
the set of actual cats fall under another concept, let us say that of being the<br />
most-common-four-legged-animals-whose-average-weight-is-W, call this<br />
the concept ‘maxifourn’. In this situation the extensions of the concepts cat<br />
<strong>and</strong> maxifourn are identical: they have all <strong>and</strong> only the same members. Nonetheless,<br />
it is natural to say that the property of being a cat is not the same as<br />
that of being a maxifourn. Little Felix would still be a cat even if, because of<br />
population changes, he were no longer a maxifourn; meanwhile in the same<br />
situation though Derek the dachshund might then be a maxifourn he would<br />
not thereby have become a cat.<br />
The point is clear: concepts distinguish objects in virtue of their properties<br />
<strong>and</strong> even where two concepts are co-extensive – have all <strong>and</strong> only the same<br />
instances – the properties they designate may differ. This is so even where the<br />
properties in question are not merely co-extensive but necessarily so, i.e.<br />
where, unlike the cat/maxifourn example, there is no possibility of their extensions<br />
diverging. Every triangle is a trilateral <strong>and</strong> vice versa, <strong>and</strong> in some manner