Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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146 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
to be the more plausible, yet the former deserves further consideration. In<br />
the case of non-rational agents it is reasonable, both philosophically <strong>and</strong> as<br />
part of biological science, to maintain that their powers <strong>and</strong> tendencies are<br />
ordered or adapted to objective natural goods. If the general pattern is to be<br />
maintained we should then say that the power of rational choice is similarly<br />
directed towards states objectively beneficial to the agent. But that claim<br />
seems to be refuted by the fact that agents often choose actions that are<br />
naturally or morally bad. Nevertheless, it may be that every end of action is<br />
objectively good in some respect relevant to the agent’s real interests as a<br />
being of a certain sort, but that this goodness is more or less partial.<br />
This possibility returns us to the idea that evil is a privation. I argued that<br />
God permits moral evil because of the good of free agency that gives rise to it.<br />
There is nothing inevitable about wrongdoing but in creating free agents God<br />
creates the possibility of it. What needs to be added is that for the most part<br />
he even sustains us in our folly <strong>and</strong> maintains the sources of suffering. This<br />
is because the creative activity of God is continuous <strong>and</strong> omnipresent; the<br />
qualifying phrase ‘for the most part’ refers to the possibility of special acts or<br />
miracles.<br />
Deists hold that the universe is a strictly deterministic physical system<br />
brought in being by a God who thereafter had nothing further to do with it.<br />
This philosophy of divine indifference is hardly an attractive one; it has very<br />
little explanatory power <strong>and</strong> it will not sustain a religion of prayer <strong>and</strong> worship.<br />
According to theism, by contrast, the dependence of the universe upon<br />
God is continuing <strong>and</strong> complete, for he is active in every event – but not at<br />
the cost of the agency of his creatures. This doctrine of immanent participation<br />
may be comforting but how is it possible? God makes things with their<br />
various defining powers <strong>and</strong> liabilities; he sustains them from moment to<br />
moment; he provides opportunities for the realization of these powers <strong>and</strong>,<br />
finally, he concurs in their operation. Nothing happens without God’s active<br />
presence, yet creatures make their own contribution. This account treads a<br />
path between two extremes: quasi-deism according to which God does no<br />
more than create <strong>and</strong> maintain the existence of basic matter; <strong>and</strong> occasionalism<br />
in which he is the sole cause of every event – the appearance of secondary<br />
causation (the exercise of powers by creatures) being an illusion resulting<br />
from the fact that God acts regularly on the occasion of the co-presence of<br />
various things.<br />
The present account also provides a fruitful way of underst<strong>and</strong>ing something<br />
of the metaphysical nature of miracles. Smart gives a very good assessment<br />
of Hume’s strictures against the miraculous <strong>and</strong> I refer the reader back<br />
to it. Contra Hume, there is no compelling philosophical case for thinking<br />
that miracles are logically impossible, whatever other reasons there may be for<br />
doubting whether this or that purported event really happened. What I wish