Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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246 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
but which will not be made the better for being elaborated at length. I do not<br />
assume that we can tell what sorts of goods justify these evils, or see how they<br />
might do so in particular cases. I do assume, though, that they have a natural<br />
or supernatural justification. In saying this, however, I think we must be<br />
willing to contemplate the possibility that the occurrence of some evils is, in<br />
a sense, necessarily arbitrary. Consider an economic analogy. Suppose it is<br />
logically the case that certain ranges of high benefit economies require patterns<br />
of innovation in production <strong>and</strong> use that mean that at any given time<br />
a certain percentage of the population is unemployed or otherwise suffering.<br />
It will then be true that very good economies involve temporary suffering.<br />
Together with certain empirical facts, this will be a sufficient explanation of<br />
why some particular individuals suffer as <strong>and</strong> when they do. Even so, the<br />
structural feature does not necessitate that it be these individuals who suffer.<br />
A victim or his representative may reasonably say that the overall good did<br />
not require that he or she be among the suffering, but it remains the case that<br />
some needed to suffer in order for the good to be realized. Perhaps matters<br />
could have been arranged so that the identities of those affected were different,<br />
but it could not have been arranged so that no-one suffered. Thus, while<br />
the actual occurrence of suffering was arbitrary, the fact that there was suffering<br />
was logically unavoidable.<br />
If that is how it is in the world more generally, then evil is justified even if<br />
its distribution is to some extent arbitrary, so that the innocent suffer. What<br />
need to be added are, first, the assumption that such a world is on balance a<br />
greater good than one from which such arbitrarily occurrent evils are absent;<br />
<strong>and</strong>, second, the supposition that God will somehow ‘take account’ of the misfortune<br />
of these victims (<strong>and</strong> of the perpetrators of great moral evils). I think<br />
these considerations point towards the Christian economy of salvation <strong>and</strong> to<br />
the four last things: death, judgement, heaven <strong>and</strong> hell. Addressing myself to<br />
the analytically <strong>and</strong> dialectically minded I have given little attention to experiential<br />
factors, but I do not at all regard them as unimportant <strong>and</strong> I choose<br />
to end with an appeal to a common phenomenon, that of religious desire.<br />
There is a style of argument, much ridiculed by its critics, which runs as<br />
follows:<br />
(1) Human beings have a natural desire for eternal life in the company<br />
of God.<br />
(2) Wherever there is a natural desire for something that thing must exist<br />
(or else the desire would be frustrated).<br />
(3) Therefore God exists.<br />
Assuming that the expression ‘the company of God’ is read extensionally,<br />
so that its correct application would imply the existence of its object, <strong>and</strong>