Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Reply to <strong>Haldane</strong> 163<br />
else for its existence. If God also exists then God could be necessary in the<br />
same sense, but this would not be a good enough sense of ‘necessary’ for<br />
Aquinas or <strong>Haldane</strong>, since the same question ‘Why does it exist?’ would recur<br />
in relation to God. The universe could also be said in a sense to fill the bill for<br />
the other desideratum put forward by <strong>Haldane</strong> in the quoted passage. If to be<br />
eternal is to be outside space–time, the whole space–time universe including<br />
space–time itself is at least not itself in space–time <strong>and</strong> so might also merit<br />
the epithet ‘eternal’. Moreover, in a space–time way of looking at things we<br />
do not speak of change or staying the same, except in the sense of temporal<br />
parts of objects differing or being similar, <strong>and</strong> motion is just relative inclination<br />
of world lines. Similar remarks could be made about a super-universe<br />
if the total universe of everything there is contains many universes as we<br />
normally conceive them, as in the speculations of Carter <strong>and</strong> others that<br />
I mentioned in chapter 1. This does not of course constitute a conclusive<br />
answer to <strong>Haldane</strong>. The reader will have to decide for himself or herself<br />
whether he or she underst<strong>and</strong>s the notion of necessity that <strong>Haldane</strong> requires.<br />
Certainly I yearn for such a notion: it might help us to answer the compelling<br />
but apparently unanswerable question ‘Why is there anything at all?’ But<br />
I can’t see how I can find such a notion that would strike me as intelligible.<br />
In my main essay I suggested that an adequate concept of God for the<br />
theist should be that of an atemporal being, not that of a sempiternal being.<br />
I’m not sure that <strong>Haldane</strong> is right in laying stress on a realistic notion of<br />
causation (see pp. 123ff). I am myself suspicious about the use of the notion<br />
of causality in fundamental physics <strong>and</strong> metaphysics. (It is a very useful word<br />
for plumbers, instrument mechanics <strong>and</strong> brain surgeons.) A key element in<br />
the notion of causation is that of ‘If A had not happened then B would not<br />
have happened’. I take this as meaning that the happening of B follows by<br />
logic from the happening of A together with contextually agreed background<br />
assumptions. So the notion of causality is a contextual one. Another element<br />
in the notion of causality is a temporal one, but I think that if we do have a<br />
notion of causality it should not rule out backwards causation. Huw Price has<br />
made use of the notion of backwards causation in dealing with the problem of<br />
non-locality in quantum mechanics. 25 My own view is that Aquinas’s third<br />
way (as <strong>Haldane</strong> states it on pp. 118ff) might be improved by replacing<br />
‘cause’ <strong>and</strong> ‘caused by’ with ‘explains’ <strong>and</strong> ‘is explained by’. Of course the<br />
notion of explanation is contextual too. The main issue between us is over our<br />
relative happiness or unhappiness at the notion of a necessary being in any<br />
other sense than one (such as that of ‘depending on nothing else’) which can<br />
be sliced away by Ockham’s razor. Thus the atheist could say that the universe<br />
depends on nothing else.<br />
<strong>Haldane</strong> raises questions to do with Hume’s epistemology. Certainly,<br />
I have an inclination to defend something like a regularity view of laws of