Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 111<br />
express my thoughts; I found myself thinking about the issues because<br />
I accepted an invitation to exchange views with Jack Smart on atheism <strong>and</strong><br />
theism; <strong>and</strong> I did this because it seemed fitting. Such facts explain by citing<br />
reasons why something was brought into being <strong>and</strong> made to be as it is.<br />
Similarly, the otherwise inexplicable regularity that surrounds <strong>and</strong> inhabits us<br />
will have an adequate explanation if it derives from the purposes of an agent.<br />
Ex hypothesi, no natural agent could have made the universe; so if the question<br />
which its regularity gave rise to has an answer it can only be one that<br />
connects natural order to a supernatural order – et hoc dicimus Deum.<br />
This traditional argument pre-dates the physical <strong>and</strong> cosmological investigations<br />
that have produced the evidence of ‘fine tuning’. What that evidence<br />
involves is well described by Smart, <strong>and</strong> I take it he agrees that it adds to the<br />
strength of the argument to the extent that it makes the existence of an<br />
orderly universe even less likely than might have been supposed. The basic<br />
laws of nature feature contingent ratios that the laws do not themselves<br />
explain, <strong>and</strong> the fundamental particles whose behaviour they regulate also<br />
exhibit apparently contingent numerical properties. If any of these ratios<br />
<strong>and</strong> quantities had been different in the slightest degree then not only we,<br />
<strong>and</strong> our predecessors in the history of life, but orderly matter itself would not<br />
have existed. Crudely, the conditions necessary for the development <strong>and</strong> continued<br />
existence of anything like the universe lie within a narrow range bounded<br />
on one side by the possibility of ‘implosion’ <strong>and</strong> on the other by that of<br />
‘explosion’. As before, any explanation of this fact has to look beyond the<br />
framework of natural causation <strong>and</strong> that leads to a conclusion of purposeful<br />
agency.<br />
Assuming our common commitment to realism Smart <strong>and</strong> I would oppose<br />
neo-Kantian relocations of the source of order in the minds of observers.<br />
Whether the facts are as fundamental science now depicts them, we are not<br />
of the view that order is always a projection, <strong>and</strong> never a detection of something<br />
that is there independently of our conception of it. So the debate concerns<br />
the possibility of explaining finely tuned order in non-theistic terms. As in<br />
the discussion of organic teleology one is faced with an initial branching,<br />
down one limb of which lies another fork. First, then, there is the issue<br />
of whether cosmological order can be a basic unaccountable fact. To say that<br />
it can is to maintain that functional regularity is independent of any other<br />
kind of explanation. If one thinks that this is not a satisfactory conclusion,<br />
<strong>and</strong> it is after all no more than a restatement of that for which an explanation<br />
was being sought, then two courses present themselves: explanation by reference<br />
to purposeful agency; <strong>and</strong> explanation by reference to chance.<br />
Smart follows the latter course adopting a version of it that postulates<br />
many universes. If there is a vast multiplicity of these differing from one<br />
another in respect of their components <strong>and</strong> modes of interaction, some being