Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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244 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
actual. Since any purported parallel will be an example of a created reality,<br />
which is precisely not simple, any analogy will be imperfect, but consider the<br />
cases of white light, ideal numbers, <strong>and</strong> intellectual ability. The first ‘contains’<br />
a plurality of colours, not realized as in a rainbow but existing virtually in<br />
a way that allows for their expression out of it. The number 28 both ‘contains’<br />
<strong>and</strong> is the sum of its factors (1, 2, 4, 7, 14), but they exist in it not as<br />
members of a set, though they can be extracted from it. When we say that<br />
someone was ‘full of ideas’ we mean he had an ability to conceive <strong>and</strong> formulate<br />
them, not that he contained them as a book contains sentences.<br />
In each case what come to be diverse in their expression pre-exist without<br />
actual difference in their source: from one reality come many effects. Likewise,<br />
the diversity of natures <strong>and</strong> existents are contained virtually <strong>and</strong> abstractly<br />
in God. Order in nature calls for an explanation which is provided by the<br />
hypothesis of a divine designer. It would be problematic if this meant that the<br />
designer’s mind had to exhibit the same order; but it does not. In general it is<br />
a fallacy to suppose that the number <strong>and</strong> diversity of effects has to be matched<br />
by a corresponding number <strong>and</strong> diversity of causes or aspects. Certainly what<br />
produces the effects must have the power to do so, <strong>and</strong> on that account it may<br />
be redescribed severally by reference to its products. On this account we may<br />
say that the effects (pre)exist eminently in the cause. It is quite compatible<br />
with this, however, that an intrinsic characterization of the cause should lack<br />
any differentiation of parts or aspects. Of course, natural causes are complex<br />
in respect of their actual structure <strong>and</strong> attributes, but from the theistic perspective<br />
they belong on the side of created effects. As ultimate cause, God<br />
cannot be complex, <strong>and</strong> nothing in the notions of efficient, formal, material<br />
or final causality per se, requires that he should be.<br />
7 God, Evil, <strong>and</strong> Hope<br />
In discussing the problem of evil I proceeded directly to offer a theodicy<br />
(a justifying explanation of its existence), not marking the usual distinction<br />
between this <strong>and</strong> a defence (the more limited task of showing that evil is<br />
compatible with the existence of God). I also failed both to separate explicitly<br />
the logical from the evidential forms of the problem, <strong>and</strong> to address the latter.<br />
In making good these omissions I shall be brief, both for reasons of space <strong>and</strong><br />
because I think that the deepest intellectual challenge posed by evil is theological<br />
rather than philosophical. It calls into question not the truth of theism,<br />
but the expectation that we might underst<strong>and</strong> the place of evil in the providential<br />
governance of the world. My seeing it in these terms is, of course,<br />
connected with my philosophical belief that there are good reasons to believe<br />
in God, <strong>and</strong> with my theological belief that God made us to know him.