Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 121<br />
general principle which the counter-examples give reason to reject. I described<br />
my argument as an adaptation of the first way. Interpreting the latter as<br />
I have done here shows that the ‘Prime Thinker’ argument is a case of it,<br />
made special by also invoking the principle that the cause of conceptual<br />
activity must itself be conceptually active, or more generally (<strong>and</strong> slightly less<br />
misleadingly) the cause of thinking must itself be a thinking thing.<br />
What gives warrant to the latter principle? First, it is supported by the idea<br />
that the induction of conceptual ability is an intentional activity <strong>and</strong> therefore<br />
is expressive of purposeful intelligence in which ends are conceived. This<br />
is a matter of the form of the cause (i.e. ‘acting’) <strong>and</strong> it will apply wherever<br />
intentional ‘making to be’ is involved. Second, however, there is a special<br />
feature of the case in question which concerns the content of the process. As<br />
James teaches Alice the use of the term ‘cat’, in a context, say, where there are<br />
particular cats – Angus <strong>and</strong> Big Feet – James makes these objects intelligible<br />
to Alice. He raises them from the sensible level to the sphere of ‘thinkables’.<br />
Previously Alice could see Angus <strong>and</strong> Big Feet but she could not think of<br />
them as things of the same sort; that <strong>and</strong> much else besides is what conceptacquisition<br />
brings. Concept-induction is an intentional form of making intelligible.<br />
Thus while the earlier principle (∀x) (∃y) (if x comes to be F, then y<br />
is F <strong>and</strong> y makes x to be F) is not unrestrictedly true, I claim it is true where<br />
the value of F is ‘a thinker’.<br />
Leaving the particularities of the ‘Prime Thinker’ proof to one side, the<br />
first three of the five ways might be abbreviated as follows:<br />
I (1) In nature some things are changing.<br />
(2) Anything changing is changed by another.<br />
(3) This sequence cannot go on for ever.<br />
(4) Therefore, there is an unchanging first cause of change.<br />
II (1) In nature causes <strong>and</strong> effects are found ordered in series.<br />
(2) If there were no prior cause there would be no series.<br />
(3) This sequence cannot go on for ever.<br />
(4) Therefore, there is an uncaused first cause.<br />
III (1) In nature some things are contingent.<br />
(2) Anything contingent is caused to be by another thing.<br />
(3) This sequence cannot go on for ever.<br />
(4) Therefore, there is a necessary first cause of things.<br />
From what little expository analysis I have offered it should be clear that<br />
there remains scope for dispute about the correct representation of Aquinas’s<br />
arguments, but I would ask you to draw back from that <strong>and</strong> consider the<br />
main issues raised by these proofs. As I noted earlier these are the questions