Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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234 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
It is clear that the appeals are to experience of the world as the realist<br />
conceives it. It is important to note, however, that some <strong>and</strong> perhaps all of<br />
these arguments can be reconstructed even if that realist assumption were<br />
unwarranted or false. Suppose, for example, that there were no external world;<br />
or that it lacked the structure our concepts appear to attribute to it; or that all<br />
we ever have access to are non-referential mental contents. It would still be<br />
possible to pursue the via prima given that there is change in respect of these<br />
last, with one idea or impression being succeeded by another. Similarly,<br />
differences in modality <strong>and</strong> in degree of excellence are to be found within<br />
thought itself; as I believe are differences in causality <strong>and</strong> in teleology.<br />
Admittedly, however, these last claims are more controversial than are their<br />
counterparts concerning what is found in the extra-mental world. Nonetheless,<br />
the general point holds good, which is that the traditional arguments can<br />
be worked on the basis of idealism as well as of realism.<br />
So far as I know, this fact has not hitherto been remarked upon, but it is<br />
relevant to assessing the scope <strong>and</strong> power of an argument which has claim to<br />
be Aquinas’s most original contribution to the search for theistic proofs, but<br />
which does not feature in the quinque viae. In his Commentary on the Sentences<br />
(II) Aquinas presents three arguments for the existence of God. The first is<br />
teleological; the second is cosmological; <strong>and</strong> the third might be termed ‘ontological’<br />
– not because it is akin to the conceptual arguments of Anselm,<br />
Descartes or Plantinga, but in as much as it arises from the idea that existence<br />
is something additional to nature. Every thing (ens) is both a something <strong>and</strong><br />
an existent. Although these aspects are not distinct entities (either substances<br />
or accidents) nonetheless they are real <strong>and</strong> are related to one another as<br />
potentiality (or real possibility) <strong>and</strong> actuality (or actual existence). There are<br />
two scenarios arising from this essence/existence distinction. First, the existence<br />
of a being might be implied by, <strong>and</strong> hence be metaphysically dependent<br />
upon or identical to its nature. Second, essence <strong>and</strong> existence might be metaphysically<br />
distinct. In the latter case the being or actuality of an entity is not<br />
self-accounting but calls for explanation from beyond the thing itself. Generalized,<br />
the question becomes that of how it is possible that entities whose<br />
essences do not imply their existence nevertheless are actual. The answer can<br />
only be that they participate in being (esse) through the action of some prior<br />
actuality which is the efficient cause of their existence. The impending regress<br />
can only terminate in an actuality that is self-subsistent: something of which,<br />
uniquely, its existence belongs to its nature. And this is God, ipsum esse<br />
subsistens.<br />
This last expression has no easy non-philosophical form. We might speak,<br />
transliterally, of ‘subsistent being itself ’, or of ‘pure being be-ing’, or of the<br />
‘active existing of existence’. These formulations easily lend themsleves to<br />
superficial parody of the sort sometimes directed against what William James,