Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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178 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
of electrons <strong>and</strong> protons’ (chapter 3, p. 153). The reductionism remains, as<br />
does my objection that it is unwarranted by empirical observation <strong>and</strong> theory.<br />
On the contrary we should suppose that the irreducibility of explanatorily<br />
rich <strong>and</strong> powerful biological theory is evidence for the reality of biological<br />
entities <strong>and</strong> powers – including teleological ones. This is in no way incompatible<br />
with the claim that such entities are composed of electrons <strong>and</strong> protons;<br />
but composition is not identity. We need to distinguish in living things, as in<br />
artworks, between the medium of realization <strong>and</strong> that which is realized in it,<br />
<strong>and</strong> to acknowledge that both are real.<br />
My next step was to argue that natural ‘mechanico-evolutionary processes’<br />
are not sufficient to explain the emergence of living things, reproductive<br />
species <strong>and</strong> thinking animals. Smart addresses the transition from the nonreproductive<br />
to the reproductive by suggesting that there is no problem for<br />
naturalism <strong>and</strong> that a hypothesis of this sort is to be preferred. Why is<br />
naturalism unembarrassed? Because, Smart supposes, there is no difficulty<br />
in principle to the natural emergence of replication: ‘Why could not a selfreplicating<br />
molecule come about through the coming together of a number<br />
of non-replicating molecules?’ (chapter 3, p. 152). Well, first of all selfreplication<br />
is not sufficient for evolution. The latter requires reproduction<br />
involving the coming to be of entities sufficiently like their predecessors to be<br />
continuants of their basic nature but sufficiently different to allow for selection,<br />
in point of varying degrees of adaptation, to take place. And what<br />
reproduction requires is a highly adaptive mechanism of the sort which it has<br />
been the goal of evolutionary theory to explain. Given teleology, evolutionary<br />
theory has a role; the question is whether it is intelligible to suppose that it<br />
could be the whole story.<br />
Second, however, is the fact that there is no satisfactory naturalistic<br />
account even of primitive replication. There is nothing unintelligible about<br />
the idea which Smart mentions, that life on earth may have begun in consequence<br />
of organic molecules having arrived here from interstellar space. The<br />
problem with this suggestion, which Smart does not himself endorse, is that<br />
it is regressive. In answer to the question of ultimate origin Smart offers what<br />
is in effect a ‘why not?’ reply. Why could replicating molecules not just arise<br />
from non-replicating ones – be it that this occurrence may have a very low<br />
probability? My objection, however, was not to this being more or less likely,<br />
but to the very idea that there could be a natural explanation of the emergence<br />
of replicators from non-replicators. Indeed, this is just the sort of case that<br />
illustrates the notion of radical emergence. Some feature F is radically emergent<br />
if it is novel in a subject S (i.e. if it is not just a linear combination of<br />
instances of the same property type, as the size of a quilt is a linear function<br />
of the sizes of its constituent squares), <strong>and</strong> no naturalistic theory of the<br />
components of S can predict or explain F. 6 Thus my claim is that the power