Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
172 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
For example, in response to my claim that naturalism cannot account<br />
for conceptual thought, Smart seeks to resolve the puzzle of intentionality<br />
by appealing to Quine’s proposal that reports of mental acts be treated as<br />
describing attitudes of thinkers to sentences <strong>and</strong> predicates. Thus ‘Joe wants<br />
a unicorn’ is to be rendered for philosophical purposes as ‘Joe wants-true of<br />
himself “possesses a unicorn”’ (chapter 3, p. 157). And in reply to my argument<br />
that the meaning of a general term such as ‘cat’ cannot be identified<br />
with its extension (the set of things, cats, to which it applies) – because, for<br />
example, claims about the prospects for cats in the future may be meaningful<br />
though they do not concern actually existing animals – Smart contends<br />
that ‘cat’ refers to the set of cats, past, present <strong>and</strong> future. To which he adds<br />
‘I believe in future cats (they are up ahead of us in space–time)’ (chapter 3,<br />
p. 157).<br />
Our difference over the nature of intentional states clearly involves competing<br />
philosophical theories, <strong>and</strong> even Smart’s last, seemingly straightforward,<br />
reply has a complex of abstract metaphysical theses lying behind it. The<br />
primary issue between us is not so much about what it is that ‘cat’ refers to, as<br />
about how it is possible for a general term to have ‘sense’ <strong>and</strong> thereby to refer<br />
at all. On my neo-Aristotelian account someone who is competent in the use<br />
of the term ‘cat’, or has the corresponding concept, has intellectual possession<br />
of an abstract ‘intensional’ entity, a formal structure which is also possessed by<br />
cats (exemplifying this structure naturally or materially is what makes them to<br />
be cats). 1 Informed by the concept one can then raise questions about types of<br />
circumstances which do not obtain but in which cats might exist. (Likewise<br />
someone who has the concept of a unicorn possesses a thought-structuring<br />
principle which gives ‘shape’ to his or her thoughts notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing that<br />
there are no unicorns outside the imagination.) Smart’s rejoinder requires that<br />
reference be accountable for in general without invoking abstract senses, <strong>and</strong><br />
that in particular we accept a theory of the material universe as, in effect, a<br />
four-dimensional object some temporal parts of which feature stretches of cat.<br />
Here I am not concerned to dispute these ideas, though I regard them<br />
as untenable. I only wish to alert readers to the fact that they are thoroughly<br />
metaphysical, quite revisionary of ordinary ways of thinking, <strong>and</strong> far from<br />
being obviously true. The same points hold good for Smart’s Quineaninspired<br />
discussion of modality, <strong>and</strong> for his suggestion that the notion of<br />
causation is not metaphysically robust <strong>and</strong> may be eliminable. Similarly his repeated<br />
attempts to use Ockham’s razor to excise non-physical entities presume<br />
a background against which non-naturalist, <strong>and</strong> more specifically theistic<br />
hypotheses st<strong>and</strong> out as ontologically extravagant. Notice also that contrary<br />
to its being presented in a matter-of-fact, commonsensical fashion, the background<br />
in question is a distinctly theoretical one. Readers may have assumed<br />
that a physicalist would have nothing to do with abstract entities, but Smart’s