Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Further Reflections on <strong>Atheism</strong> 209<br />
supernatural acquaintance with the Platonic entities, as is needed in traditional<br />
Platonism, going back to Plato himself.<br />
If one is not satisfied with the minimalist account of necessity, one might<br />
be tempted to define it in terms of possible worlds. There are two objections<br />
to this. One thing is that the notion of possible world is elucidated in terms<br />
of ‘the way things might be’ <strong>and</strong> ‘might’ is itself a form of ‘possibly’. Another<br />
is that if the possible worlds are ersatz, we may wonder what they have to do<br />
with the price of fish.<br />
If a theologian were a traditional Platonist as (opposed to a Quinean one),<br />
he or she might point to an unanalysed necessity apparently possessed by the<br />
square root of 2, e, π <strong>and</strong> so on. So, as I suggested in FE p. 37, the theologian<br />
might say that God is a necessary being in the way that the square root of 2<br />
is. Though if we give no clear meaning to the necessity ascribed to the square<br />
root of 2 we still have no clear meaning as to the necessity ascribed to God.<br />
Nevertheless as I suggested in FE, a theologian would do best to think of<br />
God as eternal, not sempiternal. (Anselm in Proslogion XIII says: ‘Only that<br />
in which there is neither beginning nor end nor conjunction of parts, <strong>and</strong> that<br />
thought does not discern save as a whole in every place <strong>and</strong> at every time,<br />
cannot be thought not to exist.’ This is ambiguous between being eternal, <strong>and</strong><br />
like the square root of 2 in not being in time or space–time at all, <strong>and</strong> being<br />
sempiternal, at all times, with time being infinite towards both past <strong>and</strong> future.)<br />
It is important to prise away the commonly confused notions of temporality<br />
<strong>and</strong> even sempiternity from that of existence. I think that even a traditional<br />
(non-Quinean) Platonist should feel the lure of the unanswerable<br />
question of ‘Why does anything exist at all?’ no less in relation to the atemporal<br />
forms than about things in space <strong>and</strong> time. The theist should feel it in<br />
relation to an atemporal God no less than in relation to a temporal God.<br />
Those who believe in a temporal God may also need to confront recent<br />
speculations in cosmology, such as that new space–time universes may be<br />
spawned out of black holes. Perhaps God is super-temporal with a very<br />
complicated branching topology. As I said in FE, my advice would be to<br />
think of God as atemporal, eternal not sempiternal. Even so, as I have suggested,<br />
this does not resolve the doubts about the nature of necessity, or fail<br />
to leave us with the child’s question ‘Who made God?’ (in the form of<br />
‘Is there a satisfactory sense of “necessary” which will get round a generalized<br />
form of J.N. Findlay’s challenge?’).<br />
6 The Fine-Tuning Argument Again<br />
Some reviewers have queried my treatment in FE of the fine-tuning arguments<br />
in which I surveyed various non-theistic ways of dealing with the fine-tuning