Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Reply to Smart 175<br />
metaphysical answer involves acknowledging the existence of intensional entities<br />
– concepts <strong>and</strong> senses – which organize the realms of thought <strong>and</strong> meaning<br />
in a manner analogous to that in which natural forms organize the material<br />
world. The concept ‘cat’ st<strong>and</strong>s to a thought of a cat, as the form cat st<strong>and</strong>s to<br />
a cat. In each case a structuring principle makes something to be of a certain<br />
sort; <strong>and</strong> the question of how thought can relate us to things is answered by<br />
the fact that concepts <strong>and</strong> forms are isomorphic. More directly <strong>and</strong> intimately<br />
they are two ways of being of one <strong>and</strong> the same nature. This has an interesting<br />
theological implication to which I shall return.<br />
So far as epistemology is concerned the only possibility for a theory of<br />
meaning is that of an interpretative one. This brings us to the second broad<br />
camp in the philosophy of language. The effort to underst<strong>and</strong> what someone<br />
means is an effort to make sense of what they are saying, to construe it in one<br />
way or another by assigning a content to it. Practically this is something we<br />
do without much, if any, thought about guiding principles; but theoretically it<br />
is no easy task to say what the constraints on interpretation are. Donald<br />
Davidson, who follows Quine in regarding the theory of meaning as the<br />
theory of interpretative translation, has proposed various principles the common<br />
core of which is that if we are to underst<strong>and</strong> a speaker we must be able<br />
to see him or her as saying things that we might reasonably say were we in his<br />
or her circumstances. 4<br />
Interpretation of the sort in question is making human sense of human<br />
words <strong>and</strong> deeds. In doing this we cannot appeal to behavioural laws or<br />
reduce the task to the application of other causal regularities, like observers<br />
on the beach watching the motion of the waves. Instead we have to enter into<br />
the ocean of meanings <strong>and</strong> values <strong>and</strong> find our bearings there. To do so, all<br />
we have to rely on is our considered judgement as to what seems plausible,<br />
significant or compelling. If Smart is willing to allow cultural studies the<br />
status of knowledge then he will have to countenance meanings <strong>and</strong> nonscientific<br />
modes of underst<strong>and</strong>ing. But once this is conceded there is no<br />
longer any good reason (if there ever was one) not to allow emotional <strong>and</strong><br />
intuitive responses, as well as scientific enquiry <strong>and</strong> philosophical reasoning, to<br />
inform our opinions about the nature of reality. With this further broadening<br />
in mind let me recommend the following reformulation of the methodological<br />
principle: an important guide to metaphysical truth is plausibility in the light<br />
of total underst<strong>and</strong>ing.<br />
2 The Existence of God<br />
How does theism fare given this principle? In my essay (chapter 2) I offered<br />
arguments to the existence of God that fall under two broad patterns: teleological