Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

182 J.J. Haldane
actualized one may well look for a prior event that was the occasion for this,
but in doing so it will generally be more appropriate to look to the surrounding
environment than to the substance itself, for the operation of the power
will usually be in response to an external event.
In the case of intelligent agents the relevant power may be termed ‘rational
willing’; though in describing it as such it is important not to think in terms
of a mechanism the parts of which are brought into operation as one element
exerts an influence on the next. Instead, one should think of a structural
description that relates aspects of agency (reason and action) to one another
without assuming that these are distinct items. To emphasize what was said
earlier, voluntary action expresses the nature of a being qua rational animal. It
is in that person-related sense that action proceeds ‘from within’; though, of
course, there are also physically necessary conditions of human activity including
internal physiological ones. The distinction to keep in view, however, is
that between agency and its causal preconditions. To revert to an earlier
example, the latter stand to the former somewhat as canvas and paint stand to
a portrait; and just as an interest in character looks to the depicted face of the
sitter and not to the chemical bonding of the pigment, so an interest in action
looks to the agent and not to his or her neurophysiology.
4 Reason, Faith and Revelation
In conclusion I wish to turn from the issue of theism as an explanatory
cosmological hypothesis to evaluate less directly philosophical reasons for
religious belief. Earlier I made a case for revising Smart’s methodological
principle as follows: an important guide to metaphysical truth is plausibility in
the light of total understanding. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider other
aspects of understanding. Religious faith typically encompasses a number of
attitudes and objects, such as belief in the existence of a God or gods; a
commitment to the content of general and specific revelations; and respect for
and trust in the divine governance of the world.
Thus far, my thinking has largely been directed to the issue of justifying
belief in a God of the philosophers. Often religious believers contrast such a
being, thought of as a metaphysical postulate, with a living personal God.
Certainly one cannot induce incarnation or wring the blood of redemption
out of a ‘Cause of causes’, but it is a mistake nonetheless to sever the links
between reason, revelation and spiritual reflection. Each has a part to play in
coming to know and understand the truth about God. In the Prologue to
John’s Gospel, it is written
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God . . . all things were made through him . . . In him was life, and the life